UK-China Transparency publishes cutting-edge investigations not just on UK-China ties pertaining to the production or development of military and so-called 'dual-use' technology, but also of technology that is crucial to emerging industries, fragile supply chains, critical national infrastructure, and the overall prosperity of the UK.
Above all, we are interested in the people who power scientific and technological progress, and we are cognisant of what may be one of the most important developments of the century, the explosion of scientific talent in China.
We study the links between British universities and Chinese entities, including companies and universities. On the military front, the so-called ‘golden era’ of relations between the UK and China (c.2014-2019) saw a wave of initiatives involving collaboration between British universities and entities in the Chinese military-industrial complex (MIC).
We have conducted research on this area, for example, a study of some important connections between Cambridge University and the Chinese MIC; and a study on a programme to connect data scientists at Imperial College London to the part of the Chinese MIC focused on the design of military ‘unmanned surface vehicles’ (intelligent gunboats).
In the latter case, we found an overlap between the individuals involved in putting together the programme and networks associated with the “United Front” in the UK. The era of unregulated (or weakly regulated) institutional interactions of this kind is (more or less) now over, though significant collaboration continues at a sub-institutional level, that is between individual scientists at institutions in the UK and China, without strong institutional oversight.
We remain interested in the UK government’s intensified regulation of these interactions, as manifested through the Academic Technology Approval Scheme, Research Collaboration Advice Team, Export Control Joint Unit, and other government functions and teams.
Military-related research is, however, only a small portion of the overall collaboration in higher education between scientists in the UK and those in China.
We have an ongoing programme whereby we are collecting and analysing data on visiting researchers, Chinese-domiciled and -born scientists and students in the UK, their experiences, and their contributions to the public benefit in the UK and wider benefit to humanity. In early 2026, we revealed that in engineering at a postgraduate level in the Russell Group universities, there were twice as many Chinese nationals as British nationals. We published full data on Chinese nationals in science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM) in the UK on our blog.
By publishing this data and analysing related research security measures, we seek to inform and promote a debate about the growing preponderance and in some cases domination of Chinese nationals in STEM at elite institutions. In spite of the importance of science and technology to 21st century economies, and the reality of strategic competition and cyber hostility from China, there has been very little debate about this phenomenon.
So much for universities. We are also interested in strategic technology as it pertains to the private sector. In late 2024, we published the first part of a major study on Imagination Technologies, marking our first foray into this area. The second most significant UK semiconductor company, Imagination was purchased by the Chinese government and subsequently was the subject of some scandal. UKCT revealed that Imagination had drawn up a knowledge transfer programme whereby it transferred core assets to Chinese semiconductor companies through undisclosed and unusual knowledge and technology transfer deals.
As of February 2026, we continue to investigate Imagination and are awaiting the judgment of a court on whether full documentation can be released from an employment case in which Imagination’s former CEO successfully sued the company for matters partly related to the Chinese government’s interference in its business. We are also investigating the China dealings of ARM, the UK’s largest semiconductor company.
For more than a decade, the CCP has deployed a highly competitive programme of knowledge and technology transfer. For example, the CCP’s Made in China 2025 strategy identified a number of key industries in which China, it was posited, ought to dominate by 2025.
The CCP’s industrial strategies incorporate both unobjectionable tactics (such as investment in education or infrastructure) from which the UK might seek to learn, and improper behaviour (such as cyber espionage and dishonest dealing) with the UK might wish to challenge and counteract, along with everything in between. We are interested in the full range of activity as it pertains to the UK and China. China’s industrial policy has, since 2016 especially, prompted a highly consequential response from successive US administrations. This is a dynamic situation, playing out across various industries and supply chains.
We want to deepen understandings of how this, and China’s role especially, impacts the UK.
