The purpose of our programme on repression and surveillance is to investigate evidence of CCP activity aimed at repressing the civil liberties of its targets in the UK, including members of the Chinese diaspora whose views do not accord with its own.
This activity may be conducted physically in the UK and dependent territories or digitally from China or elsewhere.
We are also interested in the targeting of academics, experts, activists and anyone else exposing information or propounding arguments that the CCP would rather suppress.
We are cognisant that the targeting of one or a minority of people has a ‘chilling effect’ on a far great number. The dynamics of this effect may not be straightforward, but involve elements of self-censorship both conscious and unconscious, mistrust, paranoia, and so on. We are interested in investigating these topics.
For example, in August 2025, we published ‘Cold Crisis‘, a lengthy report on the CCP’s effect on academic freedom and freedom of speech amongst China studies practitioners in the UK. The report was based on 50 responses to the largest ever survey of UK China studies academics on this topic, which yielded important quantitative and qualitative data. More broadly, many of the experiences of CCP-linked repression on campus that UKCT is made aware of cannot be publicised, because those who share these stories with us want to protect their anonymity.
The subject of repression & surveillance is linked to our other areas of research. Most obviously, the CCP uses the realm of cyber & data to gather information, both targeted and en-masse, about the individuals and groups in the UK. A glance at our continuously updated list of CCP-linked cyberattacks on the UK reveals the extent of data on UK citizens that the CCP is likely to have collected.
There is also a connection between repression & surveillance and political warfare, including ‘influence‘. Most obviously, the “Overseas Chinese affairs work” and broader “United Front work” of the CCP, which seeks to cultivate a network of friendly forces in the UK, is also a vector for surveillance.
There is evidence to suggest, for example, that individuals running Chinese Students & Scholars Associations (CSSAs) are often approached by Chinese diplomats and asked which Chinese students in the UK are involved in anti-CCP activities. CSSAs are a network of student societies in British universities, ‘branches’ of CSSA-UK, an embassy operation that has described itself as a directorate of an arm of the United Front Work Department of the CCP.
Most of the activities of CSSAs are harmless and beneficial to Chinese student communities, for example, the running of parties and other social events.
It is these same positive connective functions that make CSSAs a useful vector for surveillance.
This reflects a pattern in “United Front work”: the establishment of or support for groups whose primary purpose is positive, and the subsequent exploitation of these groups and those involved in them for repression & surveillance. You can read our page on “United Front work” in the UK to find out more about this.
As with all our research areas, when it comes to repression & surveillance, we are primarily focused on these phenomena as they manifest in the UK, not in China.
The following are some of the important topics subject to CCP speech policing and repression:
- Democracy, free speech, and human rights in the PRC
- Corruption in the CCP
- Xi Jinping thought and political reforms
- Ethnic policy and identities in Tibet, Xinjiang, and elsewhere
- Religious freedom in the PRC, including the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners
- Hong Kong’s democracy/independence movement
- The political status and history of Taiwan
- Transnational repression, CCP infiltration, and interference in other countries
- All forms of state violence, including but not limited to arbitrary detention and ‘disappearances’
- Civil society, protest, and labour relations
