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To: [SMC-list](#)
Subject: China discussion follow up
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Dear all,

Further to our discussion this morning regarding China, Brendan is now updating a version of his paper Simon can share with relevant academics.

I have also checked the EPPTP training programme from 2006-2016. It is NOT running at the moment. It ended after 10 years, we had two tracts of funding for two 5 year terms. We have had on-off discussions on a new replacement programme, however, there were significant changes within the training process in Chinese government from 2016 onwards. The Central Organization Division is no longer permitted to run training programmes directly, rather it must be in partnership with Central Party School (CPS).

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Confucius Institutes and the University: Distinguishing the Political Mission from the Cultural

CHRISTOPHER R. HUGHES

The rapid spread of Confucius Institutes (CI) around the world has received growing attention from both critics and admirers. The former question whether it is right for organizations funded and governed by the Chinese state to operate on campuses in liberal-democratic societies; the latter claim that the CIs contribute to the general good by facilitating the teaching of the Chinese language and enhancing academic exchange. This paper will scrutinize the role of the Confucius Institute by debating over the missions of the university and the institute itself. A careful look at the organizational links between the institutes and the CCP will be provided. This paper argues that the clash of missions may be seen as risks by academic staff and students in host institutions; they are merely the consequences of the CIs fulfilling the mission with which they have been entrusted.

KEYWORDS: Confucius Institute; Hanban; CCP; political mission; cultural mission.

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After China started to establish Confucius Institutes (CIs) around the world in 2004, a first wave of academic analysis appeared that was far from conclusive in deciding whether this was a

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welcome development. Some observers raised concerns over the implications for academic freedom of having organizations funded and governed by the Chinese state operating on campuses in democratic societies.¹ Others found little evidence that they were engaged in political activity beyond the kind of cultural diplomacy that is legitimately pursued by many governments.² Since then, the debate on whether the CI's are compatible with the core mission of the university in a democratic society has continued to intensify, especially since the publication of a harsh critique by the distinguished University of Chicago anthropologist, Marshall Sahlins, in October 2013.³

Little of this discussion, however, has explored how the spread of the CIs has been encouraged by changes in the nature of higher education that are driven by factors such as the shifting of funding away from government spending and the need to bolster the social legitimacy of universities by providing policy relevant research and employment focused training. For the first time in history, however, these developments are providing the context within which a one-party state is able to use its growing economic capabilities to influence the work of universities in democratic societies found in North America, Europe, Australasia, Japan and India.⁴ It is important to bear this in mind when assessing the impact of the CIs, because if the university is understood to be one of the most

¹Anne-Marie Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China* (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 165.

²Falk Hartig, "Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 17, no. 1 (2012): 53-76; James F. Paradise, "China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power," *Asian Survey* 49, no. 4, (2009): 647-69.

³Marshall Sahlins, "China U.," *The Nation*, October 29, 2013, <http://www.thenation.com/article/176888/china-u#>; For a rejoinder, see Edward A. McCord, "Confucius Institute: Hardly a Threat to Academic Freedoms," *The Diplomat*, March 27, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/confucius-institutes-hardly-a-threat-to-academic-freedoms/>; for a broad range of perspectives triggered by the growing dispute see also Perry Link, "The Debate Over Confucius Institutes," *ChinaFile*, June 23, 2014, <http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/debate-over-confucius-institutes> (accessed October 3, 2014).

⁴For the purposes of this discussion a "democratic" society can be taken to mean a society that allows more than one party to engage in free and fair elections and places a high value on the freedom of expression and association and the rule of law.

important institutions shaping the values of a democratic society, its status as an independent source of critical knowledge is important not only for education but also for the healthy development of democracy itself.

This article will thus attempt a reassessment of the debate over the CIs by setting the basic positions in the early literature in the context of a brief discussion of the changing nature of the university itself. It will then present the available information concerning the mission of the CIs and their relationship to the Chinese Party-State. This will be followed by an account of the risks that are involved in the hosting of CIs. Finally, an assessment of the ability of universities to manage such risks will be made in light of the latest developments. In the process, it is particularly important to look at how incidents that have occurred with the CIs in recent years allow us to begin to move beyond Paradise's conclusion in 2009 that "only time will tell whether the Confucius Institutes can help spark a more sympathetic understanding of China and usher in a more benign view of it."⁵

The Mission of the University

Very little was said about the changing mission of the university in the first wave of literature on the impact of the CIs. Paradise's groundbreaking article in 2009, for example, is primarily concerned with whether the CIs are effective tools for the promotion of a positive international image for China. Hartig's 2012 account of the operation of CIs in Germany also largely focuses on asking whether they are engaged in the same kind of cultural diplomacy as organizations sponsored by democratic states, such as the Goethe Institutes or the British Council.⁶ Although Starr looks at the impact of CIs on education, he is mainly concerned with pedagogical issues, such as the political implications of the exclusion of traditional

⁵Paradise, "China and International Harmony," 664.

⁶Hartig, "Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China."

characters and dialects from their curriculum,⁷ rather than the evolution of the broader mission of the university.

When assessing the impact of the CIs, however, it is important not to assume that the mission of the university is unchanging. It has undergone constant change since World War Two, since, like all institutions in democratic countries, the authority of the university to determine its own purpose has been challenged by a series of crises. Events like the Vietnam War and the rise of the “counter-culture” movement, combined with new social demands such as the call to give minorities greater access and accommodate their interests in curriculum changes, the need to solve domestic problems related to issues such as the environment, health and housing, and the need to supply personnel equipped to work in a post-industrial society have all had an impact. In 1970, the sociologist Daniel Bell (not to be confused with the eponymous advocate of Confucian meritocracy currently based at Tsinghua University in Beijing) provided a useful way of conceptualizing this dynamic process by proposing that the values of the university could be understood as defined by a tension between what he called “classical” and “pragmatic” models. The former was rooted in the origins of the university as an organization entrusted by society to pursue the truth and evaluate culture through a theoretical questioning of anything and everything. The latter sees the role of the university as being primarily to serve society through training large numbers of people, the application of knowledge and providing personnel to serve in government and elsewhere.⁸

Although much has changed in society and the university since the days of the anti-Vietnam War movement, Bell’s categories still stand as a useful starting point for understanding the origins of the debate over the mission of the university today. This is because much of the discussion of the mission of the university in the subsequent decades can be seen as

⁷Don Starr, “Chinese Language Education in Europe: the Confucius Institutes,” *European Journal of Education* 44, no. 1 (2009): 65-82.

⁸Daniel Bell, “Quo Warranto?—Notes on the Governance of Universities in the 1970s,” *National Affairs*, no. 19 (Spring 1970): 63.

the search for an optimal balance between his two models. Some have decried the decline of the university as an institution defined by nothing more than the mission to pursue knowledge for its own sake.⁹ More moderate voices accept the need to meet pragmatic demands but still argue that the university must never forget that it also has a role in protecting and promoting the humanistic conception of the individual as a citizen, which makes the university “intrinsically related to the extension of democracy. . . .”¹⁰ Most academics would agree with the view put forward by Craig Calhoun and Diana Rhoten that while it is right for the university to be engaged in the practical affairs of society, it should also maintain a public mission of cultivating citizenship and advances in civil society, as well as presenting scientific inquiry and debate as a model for the kind of behavior citizens need to practice for democracy to work.¹¹

Maintaining the classical model has become increasingly hard as the growing demands on universities have been combined with diminishing financial support from the state. At the same time, the rise of neo-liberal economics and the greater ease of travel and communication leave universities competing for students and prestige in an international market. The global financial crisis in 2008 only added to the pressure, as institutions have seen diminishing returns from alternative sources of income, such as endowments. A raft of reforms to higher education introduced in the United Kingdom in 2010, for example, dramatically raised tuition fees and removed government funding for teaching the arts, humanities and social sciences. The result of such global trends is the emergence of the “enterprise university,” in which decision-making is increasingly centralized at the expense of governance procedures that were put in place to

⁹Kenneth Minogue, *The Concept of a University* (1973; repr., New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2009).

¹⁰Thomas Docherty, *For the University: Democracy and the Future of the Institution* (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2011), Kindle Loc. 577.

¹¹Craig Calhoun, “The Public Mission of the Research University,” in *Knowledge Matters: The Public Mission of the Research University*, ed. Diana Rhoten and Craig Calhoun (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), Kindle Loc. 539; Diana Rhoten and Craig Calhoun, “Preface,” in *Knowledge Matters*, Kindle Loc. 274.

preserve the values at the heart of the classical model, in order to meet targets set by governments and achieve status in league tables.¹²

Despite these radical changes, however, when the literature on the changing mission of the university broadens its focus to the international context, it remains rooted in an age when the major question was whether developing countries would follow the model set by the advanced industrialized democracies. As developing societies became richer, it was expected that they would follow the model of allowing their institutions to unite freedom of intellectual inquiry with the creation of new knowledge through research, the nurturing of a scholarly community, open public communication and efforts to make knowledge widely available as a public good.¹³ With China on track to become the world's biggest economy by the middle of this century, putting its government in an increasingly strong position to shape social values in democratic societies through their universities, such a perspective is rather anachronistic.

By 2008, the complex dilemmas that this power shift presents for academic institutions had already begun to emerge through episodes such as the claim made by the *China Daily* that the vice-chancellor of London Metropolitan University had sent a letter of apology to China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after a report appeared in the Chinese press that migration agents and students were threatening to boycott his institution for awarding an honorary doctorate to the Dalai Lama.¹⁴ The university itself claimed that no letter had been sent and that its vice-chancellor had only "expressed regret at any unhappiness that had been caused to Chinese people" by the award of the honorary degree to the Dalai Lama in a meet-

¹²Simon Marginson and Mark Considine, *The Enterprise University: Power, Governance and Reinvention in Australia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Jan Currie and Janice Newson, *Universities and Globalisation: Critical Perspectives* (London: Sage Publications, 1998); Jan Currie et al., *Globalizing Practices and University Responses: European and Anglo-American Differences* (Westport CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003).

¹³Calhoun, "The Public Mission," Kindle Loc. 313.

¹⁴"Duo jia liuxue zhongjie biaooshi dizhi ting 'Zang du' Yingguo gaoxiao" (Several overseas study agencies say they will boycott the British university that supports "Tibetan independence"), *Huanqiu shibao* (Global Times), June 13, 2008, <http://world.people.com.cn/GB/57506/7380085.html> (accessed February 18, 2013).

ing with staff from the Chinese embassy.¹⁵ Whatever form the university's response took, though, a member of the embassy staff was reported to have demanded that the university should refuse speaking platforms to Tibetan independence groups if it wanted the relationship to return to normal.¹⁶ Yet commentators like Hartig and Paradise do not look at the implications of this shifting context for the long-term impact of CIs, even though the Chinese government aims to establish 1,000 around the world by 2020, a target that has already been half-met in 2014.

With CIs in the United States being offered volunteer teachers and USD150,000 as startup funds from the Hanban and “provide a set amount of annual fund [sic] according to needs,”¹⁷ the attractions for cash-strapped universities seem strong, even if they are expected to provide matching funds and local laws often mean that Chinese staff have to be paid at standard rates.¹⁸ Many of the first assessments of the CIs, however, did not see such a relationship with the Chinese state as problematic because they tended to equate the new organizations with institutions such as the British Council or Germany's Goethe Institutes.¹⁹ Such sanguine appraisals, however, do not stand up to scrutiny when attention is paid to the way in which the work of the CIs is tied to the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), an organization that promotes the ideals of a one-party system and adopts policies that are seen by many inside and outside China as not only detrimental to many individuals and social groups but also as incompatible with the democratic aspects of the classical model of the university. To test this point, it is worth looking again at

¹⁵“‘Regret at Unhappiness’ over Dalai Lama’s Degree,” *Times Higher Education*, July 9, 2008, <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/regret-at-unhappiness-over-dalai-lamas-degree/402720.article>.

¹⁶Xiang Li, “London School Regrets Honoring Dalai Lama,” *China Daily*, August 7, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-07/08/content_6826398.htm.

¹⁷“Agreement Between Confucius Institute Headquarters of China and [country and institution name] on the Establishment of Confucius Institute at [institution name].”

¹⁸Peter Schmidt, “At US Colleges, Chinese-Financed Centers Prompt Worries About Academic Freedom,” *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 22, 2010, <http://chronicle.texterity.com/chronicle/20101022a?pg=8#pg8>.

¹⁹Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” 68–69.

the available information concerning how the mission of the CIs is shaped by the Chinese Party-State.

The Mission of the CIs

The Confucius Institute Headquarters in Beijing, commonly known as the “Hanban,” presents its mission in terms that appeal to both the classical and the pragmatic models of the university, being “committed to providing Chinese language and cultural teaching resources and services worldwide, it goes all out in meeting the demands of foreign Chinese learners and contributing to the development of multiculturalism and the building of a harmonious world.”²⁰ The template contract that the Hanban uses to agree partnerships with universities also declares that the purpose of the CIs is to “strengthen educational cooperation between China and [the host country], support and promote the development of Chinese language education, and increase mutual understanding among people in China and in [the host country].” Article 4 of the contract establishes the scope of CI activities in more detail as:

1. Teaching Chinese language and providing Chinese language teaching resources.
2. Training Chinese language instructors.
3. Holding the HSK examination (Chinese Proficiency Test) and tests for the Certification of the Chinese Language Teachers.
4. Providing information and consultative services concerning China’s education, culture, and so forth.
5. Conducting language and cultural exchange activities.
6. Other activities with authorization and by appointment of the Headquarters.²¹

²⁰“About Us,” Hanban website, http://english.hanban.org/node_7719.htm (accessed February 13, 2013).

²¹“Agreement Between Confucius Institute Headquarters of China and [country and institution name] on the Establishment of Confucius Institute at [institution name].”

This stress on the pragmatic aspects of language training and international cooperation is certainly attractive to many universities around the world, which are grateful for the provision of language teachers in particular. Yet the political system in China is built on an understanding of the relationship between culture and politics that is very different from that found in the democracies that sponsor organizations such as the British Council. This has its origins in a long CCP tradition that still refers to the series of lectures on culture given by Mao Zedong (毛澤東) in the CCP base area of Yan'an in May 1942, in which he instructs an audience of artists, musicians and writers to understand that "There is in fact no such thing as art for art's sake, art that stands above classes or art that is detached from or independent of politics." According to Mao, the task of cultural policy is to form a "cultural army" that is "absolutely indispensable for uniting our own ranks and defeating the enemy."²² Although Mao's speech was delivered in the very different context of the war against the Japanese and political struggles against opponents in the CCP and the Guomindang Nationalists, it is still celebrated on its anniversary down to today. If anything, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the spirit of Yan'an has been strengthened, as indicated by his speech to the Beijing Forum on Literature and Art Work in October 2014, in which he reminds his audience that "serving Socialism" is the fundamental orientation of the arts, which should combine socialist ideology with Chinese tradition in order to "implement the Party's literature and art principles and policies well, and grasp the correct orientation of literature and art development."²³ The persistence of this linkage between culture and the interests of the CCP in foreign relations is evident in the expectation that cultural produc-

²²Mao Zedong, "Talks at the Yen'an (sic.) Forum on Literature and Art," http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_08.htm (accessed February 13, 2013).

²³A summary was published by the Xinhua news agency and the original text of the speech was not published. An English version can be found online at "Xi Jinping's Talk at the Beijing Forum on Literature and Art," *China Copyright and Media*, October 16, 2014, <http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/16/xi-jinpings-talks-at-the-beijing-forum-on-literature-and-art/>.

tions made for export should convey a positive view of modern China and in pressure on the foreign organizers of overseas events not to allow activities that are deemed to be a source of possible embarrassment.²⁴ In the process, criticisms of the CCP and its policies are erased.

While the more modern idea of public diplomacy has been very attractive in China in recent years, it is still shaped by the norm of seeing culture as a tool for the preservation and promotion of CCP power. That the CIs are no exception to this instrumentalism was evident when Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, proclaimed to the Hanban in April 2007 that the CIs are “an important part of China’s international popularization (*xuanchuan*).”²⁵ How such a statement is understood by a foreign audience depends largely on what is meant by the Chinese term “*xuanchuan*” 宣傳, rendered by international news organizations such as *The Economist* as “propaganda” when translating Li’s speech.²⁶ In recent years, however, this term has been rendered into English as “publicity,” a practice that is adopted by Paradise. More recently, in a response to the critique of the CIs by Sahlins, Edward A. McCord, an eminent professor of modern Chinese military history at George Washington University, has argued that *xuanchuan* has no negative connotations because it is similar to the use of “propaganda” by the Catholic church. When Li’s speech is understood in this context, he maintains, it is merely defining the role of the CIs in “more limited soft power terms.”²⁷

Of course, equating *xuanchuan* with Vatican propaganda is itself problematic for advocates of academic freedom, given the long struggle

²⁴Sheila Melvin, “Commemorating Mao’s Yan’an Talks,” *ArtsJournal Blogs*, May 15, 2012, <http://www.artsjournal.com/china/2012/05/commemorating-maos-yanan-talks/> (accessed February 21, 2013).

²⁵“Li Changchun: Zhashi zuohao hanyu guoji tuiguang gongzuo” (Li Changchun: Work Well to Internationalize the Chinese Language), *Xinhuanet*, April 24, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-04/24/content_6022792.htm.

²⁶“A Message from Confucius: New Ways of Projecting Soft Power,” *The Economist*, October 22, 2009, <http://www.economist.com/node/14678507>.

²⁷McCord, “Confucius Institute.”

between science and the Church. Moreover, it is rather misleading for McCord to equate *xuanchuan* with soft power terms in this way because the CIs are so closely tied to the program of a particular political party. There is no secret about this in CCP documents, its Central Committee even passing a key resolution on promoting the development of “socialist culture” at its plenary session in October 2011, in which CIs were described (along with the Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television) as part of the drive to “create new methods of *xuanchuan* to strengthen our international right to speak, respond to foreign concerns, improve international society’s understanding of our basic national conditions, concepts of values, road of development, domestic and foreign policies, to display our country’s image of civilization, openness and progress.”²⁸

The way in which this cultural policy is designed to promote the CCP vision of a China characterized by “socialist culture” also makes it misleading to equate what the CIs do with the notion of building “soft power.” The inventor of this concept, Joseph Nye of Harvard University, distinguishes it from state power, seeing it as an attractive force that emerges from grass roots social and economic activity. He has explicitly cited CIs as an example of the misguided belief that government is its main instrument.²⁹ When interacting with foreign commentators, moreover, Chinese interlocutors thus shy away from acknowledging this link

²⁸“Chuangxin duiwai xuanchuan fangshi fangfa, zengqiang guoji huayu quan, tuoshan huiying waibu guanqie, zengjin guoji shehui dui wo guo jiben quoqing, jiazhi guannian, fazhan daolu, nei wai zhengce de liaojie he renshi, zhanxian wo guo wenming, minzhu, kaifang, jinbu xingxiang” (創新對外宣傳方式方法，增強國際話語權，妥善回應外部關切，增進國際社會對我國基本國情、價值觀念、發展道路、內外政策的了解和認識，展現我國文明、民主、開放、進步的形象), Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), “Shouquan fabu: Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shenhua wenhua tizhi gaige tuidong shehuizhuyi wenhua da fazhan da fanrong ruogan da wenti de jueding” (Official proclamation: Resolution of the central committee of the CCP on some big problems related to deepening reform of the cultural system to promote the great flourishing of socialist civilization), *Xinhuanet*, October 26, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-10/25/c_122197737_7.htm.

²⁹Joseph S. Nye, “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy*, April 29, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power?wp_login_redirect=0.

between the CIs and the interests of the Party-State. Paradise, for example, describes how a university administrator he interviewed in Shanghai stated that it is “misleading” to think that CIs have anything to do with soft power, leading him to propose there is a division between academics and a political elite that does believe in the importance of soft power.³⁰ Yet even the most cursory survey of writing about CIs in Chinese academic journals shows that there is no hesitation in presenting them as tools for the enhancement of the “soft power” needed to advance the CCP’s “go global” economic policy and turn China into a major world power.³¹ Chinese academics note approvingly that the building of soft power is a target in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for the economy (2011-2015).³²

The Difference Between CIs and Other Institutions for Cultural Diplomacy

This use of culture to promote the political programs of a particular party shows that it is quite wrong to equate CIs with cultural diplomacy organizations established by democratic states. Even if it is accepted that organizations like the British Council and Goethe Institutes use culture to

³⁰Paradise, “China and International Harmony,” 657.

³¹For a sample to show how articles on CIs in Chinese academic journals cite Nye’s concept of “soft power” as the inspiration for the CIs, see Wang Shuaidong, “Guanyu Zhongguo wenhua duiwai chuanbo xinxing celue zhi ‘Kongzi xueyuan da chun wan’ de sikao” (Thoughts on the “Confucius Institute Grand New Year Evening” and the new strategy for spreading Chinese culture abroad), *Jiaoyu jiaoxue luntan* (Education Teaching Forum) (Hebei), no. 39 (2012): 79; Liu Xiaoli, Li Hui, and Gui Ling, “Shijie qita yuyan wenhua tuiguang jigou fazhan moshi dui Kongzi xueyuan ke chixu fazhan de qishi” (Lessons for the consistent development of the Confucius Institutes from the mode of development of other organizations in the world for promoting language and culture), *Changjiang xueshu* (Yangtze River Academic) 3, no. 22 (2012): 122; Zhou Yun, “Cong guoji xingxiang shijiao kan Kongzi xueyuan zai Meiguo yuyan chuanbo de fazhan” (Looking at the development of language transmission of the Confucius Institutes in the United States from the perspective of international image), *Yunnan xingzheng xueyuan xuebao* (The Journal of Yunnan Administration College) (Yunnan), no. 6 (2012): 162.

³²Ding Zhongyi and Wei Xing, “Kongzi xueyuan: Zhongguo ruan shili jianshe de youxiao pingtai” (Confucius Institutes: An effective platform for establishing China’s soft power), *Lilun yu gaige* (Theory and Reform), no. 5 (2011): 122-25.

promote certain political values, the question of which values are being promoted by the CIs is what is important for universities in democratic societies. If guarding and cultivating ideals that are seen as necessary for democracy to work, such as freedom of thought and expression, models of citizenship, and advances in civil society, are critical, it is inappropriate for them to host and lend legitimacy to organizations that promote the values of China's one-party state, even when these are presented as "publicity" for China's "national conditions." On this point, it is important to stress that there is a big difference between organizing a conference with a Chinese university or working with academic colleagues from China on the one hand, and allowing an institution that has the mission of promoting the values and interests of the CCP to have a long-term base on campus and to share in the prestige of the university by having a page on its website and use of its logo, on the other.

In contrast to this kind of arrangement, an organization like the British Council goes to great lengths to ensure that it is not tied to any party political interests. Although it receives a government grant and presents an annual report on its objectives and programs to the Secretary of State and Parliament, it is established as a public corporation with a charter that ensures that it is free from direct political interference by the government, the state or political parties. Its executive board and board of trustees are composed of figures drawn either from the Council itself, or more broadly from the worlds of the arts, business and commerce. The only government representation is in the form of a member of the board of trustees who is an employee of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. When the Council's work can be described as having a political agenda, such as its mission to promote social change and voice and accountability for all by encouraging the institutional development of justice, the rule of law, civil society and economic development, this is openly stated on its website.³³ More importantly, this does not present a problem for universities

³³British Council website, <http://www.britishcouncil.org/governance-work-2.htm> (accessed February 21, 2013).

in countries where the Council operates because branches of the British Council are not located on campuses but in premises paid for by the Council itself.³⁴

The CIs, on the other hand, are located on university campuses, are closely linked to the Chinese Party-State and have a political program that is openly discussed in China but not mentioned on their website or contracts. The contract signed between the Hanban and the host university, and the Constitution of the Confucius Institutes, moreover, give the Hanban a large degree of control. It goes so far as to state that CI activities “shall not contravene concerning (sic) the laws and regulations of China.”³⁵ There are two reasons why such a wide-ranging clause should give rise to concern. First of all, it constrains the freedom of the CIs to offer a balanced view of some of the issues of most interest to a foreign audience. The Anti-Secession Law, for example, makes it illegal to advocate the independence of Taiwan. Linked to this, these terms oblige the Hanban to filter out prospective personnel who might have been involved in activities such as organizing independent trade unions, joining certain religious groups and promoting democracy and human rights, all of which have been reasons to imprison individuals and proscribe organizations in China. The combination of these factors is what lies behind an embarrassing event like the application for asylum filed by a teacher posted to the CI at McMaster University in Canada, on the grounds that she found herself in the position of either having to hide her membership of Falun Gong in order to work at the university, or incriminate herself by refusing to sign. Yet if there is any disagreement with the host institution over what activities a CI is permitted to undertake, the bylaws of the Confucius

³⁴Germany’s Goethe Institutes have a slightly different model insofar as they do have a small number of offices in language colleges in China, but not in research universities. Li Xiangping, “Kongzi xueyuan yu Gede xueyuan bijiao yanjiu” (Comparative research on the Confucius Institutes and the Goethe Institutes), *Dangdai jiaoyu lilun yu shijian* (Theory and Practice of Contemporary Education), no. 11 (2012): 27-31.

³⁵“Constitution of the Confucius Institutes,” August, 29, 2009, Chapter 1 Article 6. Available online at Confucius Institute Online, http://college.chinese.cn/en/article/2009-08/29/content_22323.htm (accessed February 13, 2013).

Institutes place the power of assessment and adjudication in the hands of the Hanban. The Hanban is even given the power to impose a range of sanctions, from terminating agreements to pursuing legal action to affix responsibility and to invoke punitive consequences on any person or party who engages in “any activity conducted under the name of the Confucius Institutes without permission or authorization from the Confucius Institute Headquarters.”³⁶

In addition to this, the links between the CIs and the CCP can be seen in the broader system of governance in which they operate. Like Chinese universities, the CIs operate under the higher education law that is designed to serve the Chinese Communist Party by promoting “socialist material and spiritual civilization” and upholding the ideological orthodoxy of “Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory.”³⁷ Although many Chinese academics value unbiased and independent discussion of social issues through blogs and journal articles, they are also obliged to work within constraints on the freedom of expression and access to information that would not be acceptable in a democratic society, while students are subjected to political indoctrination through “patriotic education” and “national defense education,” and to counseling for harboring “radical thoughts.”³⁸

To ensure that higher education institutions adhere to such directives, they are put under the dual leadership of an academic chancellor and a CCP president, who acts much like a political commissar. The Hanban is also a part of this system of higher education, being affiliated with the Ministry of Education. It thus operates through the same type of dual governance structure, with its Chief Executive, Mme Xu Lin (who has

³⁶“Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes.” Available online at the Hanban website, http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm (accessed February 13, 2013).

³⁷Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, “*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyufa*” (Higher Education Law of the PRC), January 1, 1999, http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_619/200407/1311.html (accessed February 21, 2013).

³⁸“University Calls ‘Radical Students’ for a Quiet Word,” *South China Morning Post*, March 26, 2011, 4.

a rank equivalent to a deputy minister in the State Council—the highest executive arm of the Chinese government—and developed her career in the Ministry of Education), working alongside a deputy who is the CCP secretary to the organization.³⁹ Three of the sixteen members of the Hanban's governing Council are also members of the CCP Central Committee.⁴⁰ The most high-ranking of these is the Hanban Director, Mme Liu Yandong, a member of the Politburo since 2007. Liu has worked her way to the top through Party and state bureaucracies involved in propaganda work, including a stint as head of the United Front Department from 2002 to 2003, an organization that has its origins in the Leninist united front strategy adopted by the CCP in the early 1920s to overcome political opposition by winning over waverers, while isolating and undermining those categorized as irredeemable enemies. Since then she has continued this line of work as vice chairperson and a member of the group that represents the CCP in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a chamber that is presented as resembling an advisory upper house in which several other political parties are allowed representation in a "patriotic united front" under the leadership of the CCP.⁴¹

Another member of the Hanban Council whose presence sheds some light on the political mission of the CIs is Hu Zhanfan. A member of the CCP since 1975 and President of China Central Television (CCTV) since 2011, Hu was also deputy director of the State Administration of Radio Film and Television from 2001 to 2011, which acts as the main censor of the media. He became particularly controversial in China when, soon after his appointment to CCTV, he explained to the China National Media

³⁹"Guanyu women—Lingdao jianli" (About Us—Leaders' Concise Histories), Hanban website, http://www.hanban.edu.cn/hb/node_38260.htm (accessed February 21, 2013).

⁴⁰This information about careers of the membership of the Council of the CI Headquarters was accessed online at <http://www.chinese.cn/conference11/node_37099.htm> on May 24, 2012. When access was attempted again on December 17, 2012, the web page had been removed.

⁴¹The National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference website, <http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2012/07/03/ART11341301557187103.shtml> (accessed October 20, 2014).

Association that “the first social responsibility and professional ethic of media staff should be understanding their role clearly as a good mouth-piece” and told journalists that they were fooling themselves if they thought they were independent professionals rather than “propaganda workers.” He warned that those who did not understand this concept “would not go far.” Chinese netizens reacted by comparing Hu to Joseph Goebbels.⁴² Yet Hu was doing no more than echoing a speech given by Li Changchun to the All-China Journalists Association in October that year, in which Li explained that “the journalistic front must have a high sense of political responsibility and historical mission, deeply studying, propagating and implementing the spirit of the Sixth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee [of the CCP] in order to promote the great advancement and flourishing of socialist culture.”⁴³

Given the high priority attached to isolating and annexing the island of Taiwan in Chinese foreign policy, the presence of Zhou Mingwei on the Hanban Council is also worth noting. This is because Zhou was a deputy director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Council (the highest state organization for the implementation of China’s Taiwan policy) and became something of a minor celebrity in diplomatic circles when he was dispatched to Washington in 2001 to lobby against arms sales to Taipei and any departure from the “one China principle” following the first transfer of power in Taiwan’s 2001 presidential election.⁴⁴ In common with these high-profile figures, it is safe to say that all of the members of the Hanban management team have developed their careers in the Party and state bureaucracies involved in United Front and propaganda work.

⁴²“Quote of the Day: Hu Zhanfan’s Propaganda Workers,” *The Fragrant Harbour* (blog), December 6, 2011, <http://thefragrantharbour.blogspot.com/2011/12/quote-of-day-hu-zhanfans-propaganda.html>.

⁴³Dinah Gardner, “China Media Boss Says Propaganda Good, Journalism Bad,” *Uncut: Free Speech on the Frontline*, December 6, 2011, <http://uncut.indexoncensorship.org/tag/hu-zhanfan/>.

⁴⁴Joshua Cooper Ramo, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Message,” *Time*, March 4, 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,101335,00.html>.

Risks from the Clash of Missions

The above evidence shows that it is misleading to compare the CIs to cultural diplomacy organizations in democratic societies because they are located on campuses and serve the interests of a particular political party. Moreover, the CCP's ideological and legal position that it is legitimate to maintain power by suppressing civil and political liberties and the freedom of thought and expression is wholly incompatible with the protection and promotion of democracy that is an important part of the mission of the classical model of the university. This makes it important to look more carefully at the risks involved in hosting CIs, rather than assume that they can be managed in the same way as other academic joint programs, as proposed by McCord. The most obvious of these risks are listed below.

- 1. Employment Policy:** The Hanban's policy is in breach of the kind of employment rights found in most democratic societies today, because it discriminates on grounds of age, disability, religious and political belief. Until recently its own website explicitly stated that prospective teachers would only be considered if they were "Aged between 22 to 60, physical and mental healthy (sic), no record of participation in Falun Gong and other illegal organizations and no criminal record."⁴⁵ It is this discrimination that moved a teacher posted to the CI at McMaster University in Canada to file an application for asylum, on the grounds that she found herself in the position of either having to hide her membership of Falun Gong in order to work at the university, or incriminate herself by refusing to sign. Although the proscription of Falun Gong followers has now been removed from the Hanban website, the catch-all phrase of insisting on "no criminal record" is broad enough in the Chinese context to include not only Falun Gong adherents but also advocates of democracy and human rights. That

⁴⁵"Overseas Volunteer Chinese Teacher Program," Article 3rd. Available at Hanban website, http://www.chinese.cn/hanban_en/node_9806.htm (accessed February 13, 2012).

concerned academics have condemned such a practice as “unethical and illegal in the free world” draws attention to the way in which the presence of a CI on campus poses a risk both to individuals and to the reputation of the university as a whole.⁴⁶

2. **Propaganda:** A degree of risk to the reputation of the university for academic integrity arises from the way in which CIs organize activities that are designed to promote an overly positive view of China, while not allowing critical discussion of controversial topics such as the status of Tibet and Taiwan, or of events such as the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre. When such events are touched on, they are presented by academics from China who have a record of promoting CCP policy. When the CI at Sydney University organized a public lecture on Tibetan history by an academic from the Chinese Center for Tibetan Studies in August 2012, for example, local pro-Tibet groups dismissed the Center as “a very good outlet for Chinese propaganda.”⁴⁷ Their concerns arose because the academic concerned, Zhang Yun, has openly declared on a number of other occasions that he is on a mission to explain that Tibet has always been governed by China and was rescued by the CCP from a scheme by the Dalai Lama to restore “a society of feudal serfdom even darker and more backward than medieval Europe . . . a dictatorship of monks and aristocrats.” He has also argued that the recent wave of Tibetan self-immolations was linked to “overseas plots.”⁴⁸

⁴⁶Matthew Robertson, “At US Universities, Confucius Institutes Import Discrimination,” *Epoch Times*, August 24, 2011, <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/united-states/at-us-universities-confucius-institutes-import-discrimination-60714.html>.

⁴⁷Rowan Callick, “Uni Group ‘Propaganda’ Reshapes Lama Tale,” *The Australian*, August 13, 2012.

⁴⁸Zhang Yun’s role in the propaganda response to the Tibetan uprising in 2008 has been covered in Warren W. Smith, *Tibet’s Last Stand? The Tibetan Uprising of 2008 and China’s Response* (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 111. For more on Zhang’s views see “Self-Immolations in Tibetan Area Linked to Overseas Plots,” *Xinhuanet*, December 6, 2011. Online at China.org: http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-12/06/content_24087725.htm (accessed February 21, 2013); “Tibetan Feudal Serfdom under Theocracy and Western European Serfdom in the Middle Ages,” *China Daily*, January 11, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-04/18/content_6627418.htm; “Chinese Tibet Scholars Share Expertise with Chicago Students,” *People’s Daily*, May 28, 2012, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/203691/7827823.html>.

3. Confidence of Students: The links between the CIs and the CCP can also have a negative impact on the confidence students have in the academic integrity of their institution. When the London School of Economics (LSE) opened a Confucius Institute for Business (London) (CIBL) in October 2006, for example, the local student union newspaper published a photograph on its front page showing the then LSE Director, Howard Davies, unveiling a plaque and statue of Confucius with Jia Qinglin, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, under the title, “China and LSE: hand-in-hand?” The accompanying report asked why the School was hosting a figure under investigation by a Spanish court for committing genocide and crimes against humanity due to his leading role in the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners.⁴⁹ Chinese students revealed to the author that they were disappointed to arrive at a foreign university only to discover that their own government had established an organization on campus that made it feel as though they were still under the kind of surveillance that they had to live with in China. In the words of one such student, “The Confucius Institute, to me, functions like the closed circulation (sic) television and has the potential to scare away my critical thinking by constantly reminding me: we are watching you and behave yourself.”⁵⁰ The onus should be on host universities to find out how representative such views might be, paying special attention to vulnerable groups, such as advocates of political reform in China, Tibetans and Uighurs, followers of Falun Gong, advocates of Taiwanese independence and democracy advocates from Hong Kong, and whether such views are shared by local students.

⁴⁹“China and LSE: Hand-in-Hand?” *The Beaver*, November 14, 2006, 1.

⁵⁰This quote is from an email dated May 25, 2012 from a Chinese student at the LSE who has not been identified due to considerations of privacy and safety. This is one of many emails that the author of this article received after the *Sunday Times* reported that he had cited the CI as being in an ethical dilemma during the debate at the LSE on how to develop an ethics code that could avoid a repeat of the scandal that shook the school when its links with the Colonel Gaddafi regime became the focus of media attention during the Libyan revolution of 2011. See “Beijing Cash Threatens to Plunge LSE into New Donations Scandal,” *The Sunday Times*, May 20, 2012.

- 4. Distortion of the Academic Agenda:** Another kind of risk posed to the work of universities concerns the longer-term development of Sinology and Chinese Studies as a discipline and a profession. Of particular concern to Sinologists is the way in which the Hanban insists that CIs can only use the standardized form of Putonghua Chinese and the simplified form of characters developed in the PRC. Spokespersons for the Chinese government are certainly not shy about seeing the promotion of the Chinese language as a tool to become a “strong state” (*qiang guo*) when talking to a domestic audience.⁵¹ Academics in Chinese Studies outside China are thus concerned that the conditions laid down by the Hanban deny students the opportunity to learn dialects such as Cantonese and the full-form, traditional characters used in Taiwan, Hong Kong and favored by many overseas Chinese communities beyond the direct control of the CCP.⁵² As Michael Churchman, a research student at ANU, explains, the Hanban directive that prevents foreigners from writing certain kinds of Chinese characters is based on the principle of encouraging them to extend their knowledge of China in ways that are only acceptable to Beijing, which is as political as the directive “You must not discuss the Dalai Lama.”⁵³
- 5. Impact on Existing Academic Organizations:** Fears are thus growing that a generation of China scholars may be created who will only feel comfortable working with a simplified version of China and will have difficulty dealing with historical texts or using media outlets in Hong Kong and Taiwan that are critical of the CCP. This is exacerbated by a

⁵¹See for example the article on the views of the relationship between language and great power status professed by Li Yuming (李宇明), head of the bureau for managing written cultural information at the Ministry of Information, in the leading CCP newspaper for intellectuals, *Guangming ribao* (Guangming Daily 2004). Li Yuming, “Qiang guo de yuyan yu yuyan qiangguo” (The language of the strong state and the linguistic strong state), *Guangming ribao* (Guangming Daily), July 28, 2004, http://www.gmw.cn/01gmr/2004-07/28/content_65824.htm (accessed February 13, 2013).

⁵²Starr, “Chinese Language Education in Europe.”

⁵³Michael Churchman, “Confucius Institutes and Controlling Chinese Languages,” *China Heritage Quarterly*, no. 26 (June 2011), http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/articles.php?searchterm=026_confucius.inc&issue=026.

broader concern about the long-term impact of CIs on Sinological studies, as they allow universities and governments to scale down funding for existing centers of expertise and specialist libraries. Using teachers supplied by the Hanban might also deny job opportunities to scholars trained outside China, a concern that has been expressed by towering academic figures like Yu Yingshi, Emeritus Professor of East Asian Studies and History at Princeton University.⁵⁴ Prof Goran Malmqvist, Professor of Sinology at Stockholm University and a member of the Swedish Academy, has gone so far as to describe the advent of the CIs as amounting to another kind of Cultural Revolution because they have little relationship to real sinology and are allowing universities to wind down their support for established centers.⁵⁵

- 6. Marginalization of Academics:** Prof Yu has also warned that the CIs risk creating divisions in the scholarly community as academics who refuse to cooperate are marginalized from the development of Chinese studies in their own university, while their colleagues who do cooperate enjoy access to additional funds, contacts and the making of decisions that shape the relationship of their institution with China. In this situation, even the most well established experts in Chinese studies can find themselves isolated and at odds with their colleagues when they raise concerns. The worst-case scenario is when academics no longer feel able to work in a university that does not respect their professional standards, suffering ostracization, exclusion from the university and denial of promotion. At least one academic has described in personal correspondence with the author how he/she had to leave a senior post on a Chinese program at a university in the United States after a CI was

⁵⁴Yu Yingshi and Bei Ming, “Kongzi xueyuan ji qi yingxiang—zhuanfang Yu Yingshi” (The Confucius Institutes and their influence – An exclusive interview with Yu Yingshi), *Zonglanzongguo* (China in Perspective), March 22, 2012, <http://www.chinainperspective.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=15064>.

⁵⁵Ma Ruiran (馬悅然) (Goran Malmqvist), “Ma Ruiran: Sidegermo daxue zhongwenxi de wenhua da geming” (Goran Malmqvist: The Cultural Revolution in the Chinese department of Stockholm University”), *Ming Bao Monthly*, February 28, 2012, www.21ccom.net/articles/sddb/2012/0228/54568.html (accessed February 21, 2013).

sprung on the faculty without warning, following secret negotiations conducted by the president of the university. Conditions became unbearable when the program was starved of funds until it had to accept “suggestions” from the CI on how to carry out its work.⁵⁶ New members of the teaching profession are in an even more vulnerable situation, especially if they have to commit themselves to working with a CI that is highlighted in job advertisements as a flagship project of the university.

- 7. Self-Censorship:** One of the most detrimental impacts of the threat of marginalization on the mission of the classical model of the university is that it can lead to self-censorship. Even McCord accepts that this is a legitimate concern, although he hopes it will self-correct if CIs become too overbearing.⁵⁷ Perry Link is less optimistic, seeing creeping self-censorship as the major threat posed by the CIs because it strikes at the heart of academic freedom.⁵⁸ Looking ahead, however, what academics see as measures to prevent the emergence of self-censorship are seen as obstacles to be overcome by the Hanban and the CIs in the expansion of their work into the core activities of the university through a kind of mission creep.

Mission Creep

As concern has grown over the above risks, the Hanban has responded by seeking ways to allow the CIs to broaden out their work beyond the teaching of language and traditional culture by making greater efforts to penetrate the core activities of universities. The result is a kind of mission creep. As early as April 2007 it was evident that the remit of

⁵⁶Email to the author, June 18, 2012.

⁵⁷McCord, “Confucius Institute: Hardly a Threat.”

⁵⁸Perry Link, in his contribution to “The Debate Over Confucius Institutes,” *ChinaFile*, June 23, 2014, <http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/debate-over-confucius-institutes> (consulted October 3, 2014).

the CIs could expand beyond language and culture teaching, when Japan's Waseda University opened a CI in partnership with Peking University that includes a program to assist the research activities of graduate students studying in China. The Confucius Business Institute (London) at the LSE has expanded its remit in a different way by getting indirectly involved with new academic programs related to China through the provision of language teaching for new double degrees, such as an MSc in International Affairs with Peking University and an MSc in Global Media with Shanghai's Fudan University.⁵⁹ It also organizes discussions on topics such as China's financial system, its knowledge economy, its economic situation and the "China model," sometimes led by personnel linked to the Chinese embassy. It holds an economic forum for PhD candidates, hosts visiting professors from China and organizes talks by influential Chinese speakers. Such activities may be of interest to staff, students and the public, but they impinge on the core work of the university itself, which should be the property of those academic staff who have been through the rigor of the relevant procedures to gain employment and promotion in the profession. This expanding mission is particularly significant because the LSE was cited in 2009 by Hartig as a positive example of an institution hosting a CI that confined itself to the teaching of Chinese language for business.

It appears that the annual Hanban conference in December 2012 was a turning point in this movement towards overcoming the limits being imposed by host institutions. It was on that occasion that the CIs were congratulated on having made progress in moving into a new stage of "indigenization" (*bentuhua*) that goes beyond the teaching of language and traditional culture, but were also described as being marginalized by host institutions due to political concerns.⁶⁰ A number of strategies were thus recommended to break down the barriers preventing the "integration"

⁵⁹LSE News and Views, October 30, 2006.

⁶⁰"Kongzi xueyuan. Zaoyu chengzhang de fannao" (Confucius Institutes hitting difficulties in their growth), *Xinhuanet*, December 19, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2012-12/19/d_124114541.htm (accessed February 13, 2013).

(*rongru* 融入) of the CIs into the mainstream activities of universities, schools and communities. Central to these strategies is the launching of the research-focused “Confucius China Studies Program” (孔子新漢學計畫), which is more accurately rendered into English as the “New Confucius Sinology Plan.” This involves cooperation between CIs and host institutions on the projects of doctoral students, youth leadership, study trips for scholars to “understand China,” international conferences and assistance for publishing research.

It was also explained at the conference that this strategy was to be accompanied by greater efforts to penetrate the broader academic system of the host country by holding Chinese classes in junior and middle schools and by designing the local curriculum. As the conference noted, the aspiration of over 40 countries to introduce Chinese into their national education systems presented a good opportunity to achieve this. The work of the CI at Kentucky State University was held up as an example, having supplied Chinese teachers and a curriculum for six schools. Building on such successes would require cultivating a “brigade” (*duiwu* 隊伍) of expert teachers, who could overcome the constraints on the penetration of host systems that arise from the current practice of hiring CI teachers on short term contracts and relying on ethnic Chinese volunteers, many of whom may speak English but do not even know the language of the country to which they are sent. According to Xu Lin, Hanban Chief Executive, this may involve the training of native teachers and efforts to indigenize teaching materials by making CIs responsible for teacher training in local high schools, a development that is already under way in Iowa.⁶¹

It is not hard to see how the offer of using CIs to teach school children may be attractive for financially stretched education authorities facing a growing demand for Chinese language instruction. Public controversy has already arisen, however, over issues such as the treatment of historical events in the teaching materials provided for schools under the auspices of the Hanban. When Hartig concluded that the materials used

⁶¹Ibid.

by the CIs for language teaching do not amount to propaganda, he could not have been aware of the scandal that erupted in June 2012 when it was revealed that the Hanban was providing teaching materials for school children on its own website which described the Korean War as “The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea,” which included computer animations that demonized the United States forces and portrayed the Chinese soldiers as heroes.⁶² It may be an indication of the limited influence on the Hanban of those academics in China who do question the CCP propaganda interpretation of the Korean War (which has been condemned by liberal historians for failing to acknowledge that it was North Korea that attacked South Korea in 1950). When judging whether political change inside China is likely to make the operations of organizations like the Hanban more similar to those of academic organizations in democratic societies, it is also worth noting that even the minor successes of historians in 2010 in having the state-run media acknowledge that the war was started by Stalin and Kim Jong-il have since then been rolled back.⁶³

While older students might be able to see through such attempts at indoctrination, their impact on younger children may have less certain long-term consequences. From the perspective of those pursuing China’s foreign policy goals, some satisfaction can be taken from evidence that indicates that the CIs are already inculcating more positive views among American children towards China and its government. According to one

⁶²This lesson was removed from the teaching materials available on the Confucius Institute Online website the day after the author of this article drew it to the attention of a colleague in a closed online discussion group for academics working on Chinese politics. The lesson can still be viewed at http://shanghaiist.com/2012/10/16/watch_what_the_confucius_institute.php (accessed February 11, 2013). Other Confucius Institute Online materials for teaching Chinese history can still be viewed at http://kid.chinese.cn/en/node_1019_5.htm (accessed February 11, 2013). A sense of the public controversy sparked by this issue can be gained from the ABC television news report available at <http://abcnews.go.com/US/Parenting/mandarin-language-classes-mixed-reaction-chinese-institutes-motives/story?id=17485209> (accessed February 11, 2013).

⁶³“Junshi guangjiao” Zhongguo guanmei shouci chengren shi Sidalin he Jin Richeng hemou fadongle Chaoxian zhanzheng” (“Military Corner”: China’s official media recognize for the first time that Stalin and Kim Il-song started the Korean War), *Junshi guangjiao*, June 25, 2010, <http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-worldlook-361572-1.shtml>.

survey taken of students who had attended CI language classes at Bryant University and the University of Massachusetts, Boston, the vocabulary used to describe China had moved away from terms such as “boring, alien, complex, foot-binding and communism” in favor of “beautiful, civilized, intricate, advanced, amazing, smart, interesting, respect, cool idioms, original stories, fun, hard work, increasing population.” The proportion of those with “very positive” views of China had moved from 33 percent up to 52 percent, and those with “negative” or “slightly negative” views of the Chinese government had moved down from 28 per cent to just 3 per cent.⁶⁴

While nobody should argue that schools should promote a negative view of China, it is important to ask whether it is right for universities to allow their authority and facilities to be harnessed to what looks like a propaganda campaign in the schools. Ultimately, it is part of the mission of the university in a democratic society to ensure that this does not happen. Moreover, when universities allow the activities of CIs to appear on their websites and to use their logos, they provide them with a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of students and the public who expect such brands to guarantee high standards of academic integrity.

The responsibility to protect this reputation for the entire higher education sector is especially important for the most prestigious and well-resourced universities, since there is growing evidence that smaller universities are more likely to be put under pressure by the Hanban. The University of Lyon is an example, having to close its CI in September 2013 because, in the words of its director, the Hanban hardened its strat-

⁶⁴Wu Xiaoping, “Zhongguo xingxiang de tisheng: lai zi Kongzi xueyuan jiaoxue de qishi” (Raising China’s image: Lessons from teaching at the CIs), *Waijiao pinglun* (Foreign Affairs Review), no. 1 (2011): 94.

Wu’s statistics are from a survey of opinion conducted at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, and Bryant University, of students aged 12-18 who have attended Chinese classes at the CIs. It is particularly interesting that these CI programs are funded by the Startup program, an initiative started by the George W. Bush administration in 2006 as part of the National Security Language Initiative to increase national capacity in languages such as Chinese, Russian and Arabic, which has contracted Chinese teaching out to Confucius Institutes at various universities.

egy to the extent that “it seemed that our institutional and intellectual independence became unacceptable to Beijing.”⁶⁵ The problem began when a new director had arrived with instructions from Beijing to question the content of courses and insist on a deeper integration of the institute into the University, including working with research centers and participating in teaching on degree programs. When the university resisted, Xu Lin demanded the resignation of the Chair of the institute’s board and announced, without warning, the suspension of the Hanban’s annual financial subsidy. The inflexible attitude of the Hanban prevented any possibility of reaching a compromise.

This was followed by an even more dramatic example of mission creep, when Portugal’s Minho University was forced to censor the conference materials it had produced for the biennial European Association of Chinese Studies (EACS) conference, which it co-hosted in July 2014 with Coimbra University. The Hanban’s Confucius China Studies Program had provided Euros 28,040 to the conference via Minho’s CI, which included Euros 7,000 to pay for the conference abstracts.⁶⁶ When the participants received these materials at the opening ceremony at Coimbra, four pages of the abstracts had been removed and three pages from the program, torn out by Hanban staff apparently because they contained information regarding Taiwan’s Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation (CCKF) and a book exhibition by the Taiwan National Central Library. According to EACS President, Roger Greatrex, the order to remove the pages had been issued by Xu Lin, who was visiting Portugal at the time.⁶⁷ Greatrex concluded his report on the incident by proclaiming that “censorship of conference materials cannot and will never be tolerated by the EACS.” That the Han-

⁶⁵An English version of Gregory B. Lee’s account can be found at “The Debate over Confucius Institutes, Part II,” *Chinafile*, January 7, 2014, <http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/debate-over-confucius-institutes-part-ii>.

⁶⁶“Report: The Deletion of Pages from EACS Conference Materials in Braga (July 2014),” EACS website, August 1, 2014, <http://www.chinesestudies.eu/index.php/432-test>.

⁶⁷“Letter of Protest at Interference in EACS Conference in Portugal, July 2014,” EACS, <http://www.chinesestudies.eu/index.php/433-letter-of-protest-at-interference-in-eacs-conference-in-portugal-july-2014>.

ban was able to perpetrate such an act of censorship by working through a relatively minor university, however, raises a number of questions over whether it is possible to manage the CIs within an acceptable margin of risk, especially when their status is given credibility through hosting by more prestigious and better-endowed universities.

Can the CIs Be Managed?

Despite the risks listed above, there has been only minimal discussion of whether closer institutional links with China can be managed within limits that are compatible with the mission of the university (as defined in Bell's classical model) over the medium to long term. One advantage of seeing these problems as generated by a broader process of global change that is forcing two different missions for higher education to be more closely aligned is to minimize the tendency to call into question the motives of the individuals who are involved on the different sides of the debate. In the first place, teachers who are sent by the Hanban to work at the CIs should not be blamed for working within a framework that is established by China's laws and political leaders. The motives of those who argue that the CIs are a welcome source of support for over-stretched universities to help meet the growing demands of students and businesses should also be respected. Conversely, individuals should feel free to express their concerns over the risks that arise from the presence of CIs on campus without being stereotyped by spokespersons for the Chinese government as being opposed to academic engagement and as being "irresponsible" and blinded by "cold war thinking."⁶⁸ It is ironic when Chinese academics who see CIs as instruments for projecting "soft

⁶⁸See, for example, the speech delivered by China's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Liu Xiaoming, to the Joint Conference of European Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, held in Edinburgh, published by the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United Kingdom, "Speech by Amb. Liu Xiaoming at the Opening Session of the Conference of European Confucius Institutes," June 6, 2012, <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/EmbassyNews/t938943.htm> (accessed February 13, 2012).

power” accuse those who question their location on university campuses of stirring up unnecessary fears of a “cultural invasion” based on a “China threat theory.”⁶⁹

The best way to avoid such growing divisions in the academic community is to rebuild consensus on the ethical values that define the mission of the university. Most universities do already profess to abide by ethical standards that are drawn from the classical model, such as a commitment to oppose discrimination and to respect and promote diversity, collegiality and the protection and promotion of academic freedom.⁷⁰ However, many academics are unaware that they can refer back to little-read mission statements and codes of conduct when they come under pressure. Moreover, the increasing centralization of structures of university governance tends not to be accompanied by the building of sufficiently robust measures to ensure that ethical standards are implemented, as staff have to grapple with the complex challenges of working in a globalized system.⁷¹ As is shown by the damage caused to the reputation of the LSE

⁶⁹Wang, “Guanyu Zhongguo wenhua dui wai chuanbo,” 80; Liu et al., “Shijie qita yuyan wenhua tuiguang jigou fazhan moshi,” 122; Zhou, “Cong guoji xingxiang shijiao kan kongzi xueyuan,” 162.

⁷⁰A random sample of mission statements and ethics codes of research universities—both with and without a CI—reveals that all claim to put a high value on intellectual freedom, non-discrimination and allowing individuals to develop their potential to serve society. See, for example, Harvard and Cambridge universities (which do not host a CI) at <<http://www.harvard.edu/faqs/mission-statement> and <http://www.admin.cam.ac.uk/univ/mission.html>>; and the LSE and Maryland (which do host a CI) at <<http://www2.lse.ac.uk/intranet/staff/humanResources/joiningLSE/prospectiveStaff/institutionalvalues.pdf>> and <<http://www.responsibleconduct.umd.edu/brochure.pdf>> (all accessed February 17, 2013).

⁷¹One of the main recommendations of the external inquiry carried into the links between the LSE and the Gaddafi regime, that were brought to public attention by the 2011 revolution in Libya, was to address such shortcomings by requiring the institution to draw up an ethics code and create an ethics committee. Lord Justice Woolf, *The Woolf Inquiry: An Inquiry into the LSE's Links with Libya and Lessons to be Learned* (London: House of Lords, 2011), 142. Available online: <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/woolf/home.aspx>. After prolonged internal discussion, an ethics code was drawn up which commits the School to the protection of intellectual freedom, to respecting equality and diversity and which states that “in its dealings with states, organisations, and individuals, the School should not enter into any relationship that compromises, or could reasonably be perceived to compromise, its values, or that makes it complicit in illegal activity or the suppression of human rights.” London School of Economics and Political Science, “The

and the careers of several of its academics and managers following media revelations about its links with the regime of Colonel Gaddafi during the Libyan revolution in 2011, an awareness of ethical standards is not just an issue of moral concern. It also has a direct bearing on the material interests of a university and its staff. When partnerships and external sources of funding are established, this makes it important to assess the way in which the nature and stability of a foreign regime might impact such risks to reputations and careers. Repression inside China, growing instability in Hong Kong and the risks of a crisis engendered by a downturn in relations with Taiwan are only a few of the more obvious dynamics that could present a Libya-type situation for hosts of CIs.

Even those with a relatively pragmatic outlook should be aware that the scale, speed, resources and strategic thinking of the Hanban make it important to ensure that the risks involved in hosting a CI are properly considered. This means developing clear and robust ethical codes and ensuring that concerned university faculty are fully aware of their existence and are involved in their implementation. This might help to avoid the embarrassment of appearing to be ill-informed about the risks involved in key decisions, as when the Assistant Vice-President in charge of Public and Government Relations at McMaster University had to explain to the Falun Gong newspaper, *Epoch Times*, that her institution was unaware that employees of the CI are required to sign a contract that bans association with the Falun Gong.⁷² By February 2013, McMaster had become so concerned about this situation that it decided to not renew its contract for a CI with the Hanban.⁷³

Ethics Code” (2012). Online: <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/intranet/LSEServices/policies/pdfs/school/ethCod.pdf> (accessed February 17, 2013). It remains to be seen how this will be implemented.

⁷²“Former McMaster Confucius Institute Teacher Seeks Asylum in Canada,” *Epoch Times*, August 31, 2011, <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/canada/former-mcmaster-confucius-institute-teacher-seeks-asylum-in-canada-60805.html> (accessed February 21, 2013).

⁷³“McMaster Closing Confucius Institute over Hiring Issues,” *Globe and Mail*, February 7, 2013, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/education/mcmaster-closing-confucius-institute-over-hiring-issues/article8372894/> (accessed February 13, 2013).

Such episodes have begun to multiply as faculty have felt the need to mobilize against the hosting of CIs due to a lack of consultation. One of the most prominent campaigns has been at the University of Chicago, where 170 members of the faculty have signed a petition opposing what they decried as an “academically and politically ambiguous initiative” that was established without the consent of the faculty or the Senate. Similarly, in 2007, academics at the University of Pennsylvania mobilized against proposals to establish a CI when its China experts expressed concerns that they were being bypassed by an administration that was looking for a way to “shoehorn” Chinese students in the university’s graduate programs.⁷⁴

As these concerns have spread across the sector, teaching unions have also taken action, with the American Association of University Professors passing a resolution in June 2013 that calls for universities to either shut down their CIs or renegotiate their contracts to ensure that they have control over academic matters. This action was echoed by the Canadian Association of University Teachers in December that year. There is also growing concern at the school-level, with the Toronto School Board deciding to terminate its agreement for the CIs to provide elementary school Chinese teaching in the 2014-15 academic year. It is in this context of growing opposition that some of the leading universities have found a way out by simply not renewing their contracts with the Hanban on expiry, led by Chicago and Pennsylvania in 2014.

Despite this gradual turning of the tide against the CIs, however, their number continues to grow, especially in the developing world. This means that the ethical concerns that define the classical model of the university need to be made more systematically and transparently than has been the case so far. Yet it is also important not to take pragmatic arguments at face value. Headline figures of financial donations made by the Hanban make it easy to assume that host institutions make a net gain, for

⁷⁴Daniel Golden, “China Says No Talking Tibet as Confucius Funds US Universities,” *Bloomberg*, November 1, 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-01/china-says-no-talking-tibet-as-confucius-funds-u-s-universities.html> (accessed February 13, 2013).

example. Yet if the costs of providing matching funds, accommodation and administrative support are factored into the balance sheet, there may well be more efficient ways to use scarce resources than the CI model can provide. The cost to the university of employing its own language teachers might be offset by advantages that can accrue from the in-house training of staff who are free from political constraints and motives and who are more familiar with the teaching methods used in the host country than the volunteers selected by the Hanban. In fact, one of the complaints made about the CIs in the discussion inside China is that the teachers selected by the Hanban are often poorly trained.⁷⁵ Moreover, if the Chinese government is genuinely interested in promoting teaching about China, it might be better for it to supply funds to support the provision and training of personnel by universities with no political strings attached. Rather than denying job opportunities to Chinese nationals, this would open the door to individuals who might be excluded under the Hanban system on political, religious or health grounds.

It may turn out that after submitting the decision to host a CI is submitted to a rigorous and transparent process of scrutiny, some universities will still decide that it is appropriate to go ahead with the project. If so, then the onus is on those who advocate such a position to publicly explain how hosting an organization that is linked so closely to the Chinese political regime is compatible with the public position of their university on defending and promoting values such as the pursuit of academic and intellectual freedom and respect for religious and political diversity. Another alternative is to remove such classical values from the mission of the university. If the university is understood to be an institution that both reflects and shapes the values of the society in which it is embedded, however, such a departure would have repercussions that go well beyond the fate of higher education and therefore should not be allowed to happen by default.

⁷⁵Liu et al., “Shijie qita yuyan wenhua tuiguang jigou fazhan moshi,” 120; Ding and Wei, “Kongzi xueyuan: Zhongguo de ruan shili jianshe de youxiao pingtai,” 124.

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From: [McClure.B](#)
To: [Shafik.Minouche](#); [Black.J](#); [Fung.Dilly](#); [Hix.S](#); [Neumayer.E](#); [Webb.DC](#); [Young.Andrew](#); [Nadal.L](#); [Ferguson.M](#); [Plummer-Powell.B](#)
Cc: [Thomas.Adrian](#); [Metcalf.E](#); [Seehra.I](#); [Hay.J](#); [Bennett.D](#); [Wilson5.A](#); [Lythgoe.A](#); [Watson.T](#)
Subject: Comms briefing note on WTUD
Date: 09 April 2019 17:31:29
Attachments: [WTUD Comms briefing 9 April.pdf](#)
[image002.jpg](#)
[image004.png](#)
[image006.png](#)
[image008.jpg](#)
[image010.png](#)
[image012.png](#)
Importance: High

Dear SMC,

As requested this morning, please find attached a summary Comms briefing note on the current position regarding WTUD, with thanks to Fiona Metcalfe. This note has now been circulated to Council and Court, has been shared with Brendan Smith and Elizabeth Aitken as discussed, and the whole Directorate team are fully briefed.

Also to confirm that (pending Minouche's confirmation) the Monday's SMC will be rescheduled to 12noon to enable Minouche to dial in - your diaries will be updated. Fiona will join us.

(Please also note that Mike Pearson, Head of Digital, will join us for just a few mins at the start of Monday's meeting to give you a quick preview of LSE 2030 webpages ahead of launch on 29 April. We briefed Minouche before she left).

Best,
B

Dr Brigid McClure
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From: xxxxxx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxx
To: [Shafik,Minouche](#)
Subject: Dame Minouche Shafik-LSE-Invitation Letter to Chinese New Year's Reception & Gala 2020
Date: 25 November 2019 13:06:36
Attachments: [Dame Minouche Shafik-LSE-Invitation Letter to Chinese New Year's Reception & Gala 2020.pdf](#)

Dear Dame Minouche Shafik,

Greetings from the Education Section of the Chinese Embassy in London.

Attached please find an invitation from Minister Counsellor Wang Yongli for the Chinese New Year's Reception on Thursday 23rd January 2020 in Central Hall Westminster, London.

We look forward to your attendance.

Best regards,

Guoqiang

Guoqiang Li
First Secretary
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From: [Steinmuller.J](#)
To: [Shafik.Minouche](#); [LSE.Director](#); [Hix.S](#)
Cc: [Jenco.LK](#); [Callahan.W](#); [Hughes.CR](#)
Subject: follow up, LSE links with China
Date: 07 June 2019 12:26:03

Dear Minouche, dear Simon,

Thank you meeting us to discuss the LSE's links with China.

We are grateful to have had the opportunity to directly express our concerns over the LSE's connections with China. The meeting was prompted by two recent incidents that have shown the increasing risks to the School's reputation of exposure to China. We were pleased to be able to focus the discussion more broadly on what we perceive to be a need to improve the governance of such a relationship. As scholars who have dedicated their careers to researching and teaching about China, we would like to be involved in the process.

We appreciate what you said about the complexity of the LSE's links with China, and that it is not the only country or region that raises ethical challenges. Like all such relationships, it should be continuously reviewed and scrutinized.

However, we hope that we also reached agreement that China is special due to the scale of its links with the LSE and its very substantial and growing presence on our campus. Moreover, there is added urgency for a review of our links with China because the political situation has deteriorated substantially since the launching of the School's Asia Strategy in 2003. This is demonstrated at the most extreme by the genocide taking place in Xinjiang.

Particularly pressing is the need for a rigorous and meaningful review of the Confucius Institute for Business, the PKU summer school, China foresight, and the ethical implications of having joint MSc programmes with institutions in which academic freedom is increasingly constrained by the Chinese Communist Party. The review should also scrutinize the links of the CSSA and its China Forums with the Chinese Embassy and Communist Party, to assess the risks that these pose to maintaining our core values of academic freedom, inclusivity and the protection of vulnerable groups.

Now that the political situation in China has rapidly deteriorated it is a good time to have a meaningful review. We hope our meeting has clarified our concerns and that we can provide support in addressing this sensitive and complex situation.

Bill, Chris, Hans, and Leigh

Bill Callahan, IR
Chris Hughes, IR
Hans Steinmuller, Anthropology
Leigh Jenco, Government

From: [Ross.LV](#)
To: [Shafik.Minouche](#)
Cc: [Gajewska.M](#)
Subject: For urgent approval: Letter to Chinese Ministry
Date: 06 November 2019 15:14:41
Attachments: [BFSU UoL LSE Authority of behalf of Letter -311019.docx](#)
[image001.jpg](#)

Dear Minouche,

Louise and the Executive Education Team have prepared the attached letter for your urgent approval.

Once confirmed, I will add your electronic signature and the letter will be couriered (ideally today).

Thanks so much,
Laura

Laura Ross
Executive Assistant, Directorate
EA to Dame Minouche Shafik, Director
EA to Professor Julia Black, Strategic Director of Innovation
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
t: +44 (0)20 7955 7100
e: x.x.xxxx@xxx.xx.xx
lse.ac.uk



From: [McClure,B](#)
To: [Shafik.Minouche](#); [Hix,S](#)
Subject: FW: Economist article on WTUD
Date: 11 April 2019 20:12:20
Attachments: [image001.jpg](#)
[image002.png](#)
[image003.png](#)
[image004.jpg](#)
[image005.png](#)
[image006.jpg](#)

Below FYI

Dr Brigid McClure
Head of Directorate & Strategy Delivery
COL.100 ext.7968

From: O'Connor,D
Sent: 11 April 2019 18:19
To: McClure,B <x.xxxxxxx@xxx.xx.xx>; Young,Andrew <xxxxxx.xxxxx@xxx.xx.xx>
Cc: Metcalfe,F <x.xxxxxxx@xxx.xx.xx>
Subject: Economist article on WTUD

Dear B and Andrew,

This is a brief update on media coverage for the WTUD Taiwan dispute, which can be passed to SMC.

The Economist has now published an article (full text below) about the dispute. This is featured in the magazine this week in the Britain section.

<https://www.economist.com/britain/2019/04/13/a-cartographic-clash-between-the-lse-and-its-chinese-students>

As one would expect, *The Economist* takes a broader angle than just reporting the LSE dispute - looking at the challenges facing UK universities with large Chinese student populations who may not approve of any dissent against the regime. The article uses LSE as an example to move into the wider issue.

On balance, this article does not really alter the overall narrative on the WTUD, nor does it add any new information. With this in mind, the holding line remains relevant for now, as follows:

LSE Spokesperson

"The artwork currently does not reflect our understanding of United Nations delineations that it was due to represent.

"We are consulting our community and considering amendments to the work. No final decisions have been reached."

/END

(Please note: There is a reference to Libya in the article, with an incorrect statement about timeline of the Gaddafi Foundation donation. I have corrected this with the journalist who has

passed it to their editor. This should be updated shortly)

The Media Relations Office will monitor for any follow-up on this story, or any wider developments on the WTUD.

Best wishes,

Danny

Daniel O'Connor
Head of Media Relations | Communications Division
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
t: +44 (0)20 7955 7417
e: xxxxxxx@xxx.xx.xx
lse.ac.uk



[**LSE is ranked #1 in Europe for social sciences
\(QS World University Ranking 2018\)**](#)

Article

Art attack

A cartographic clash between the LSE and its Chinese students

Beijing is aware that British universities increasingly rely on its students

The sculpture, a large, upside-down globe, brightly coloured like a child's toy, looks innocuous enough. The intention behind it, according to the London School of Economics (lse), is to recognise the university's "international community". That is not the spirit in which it has been received. Chinese students protested that Taiwan, which China claims, was shown as an independent country, and that Lhasa, in Tibet, was marked as a national capital. Following a meeting with students, press reports suggested that the lse would change the map. Cue fury from Taiwan, whose foreign ministry fired off a letter expressing its disappointment and noting that Tsai Ing-wen, the country's president, is herself a graduate of the lse.

The university now says the sculpture does not reflect the geographical boundaries that it expected, but that "no final decisions have been reached." It has stumbled into an important test of how willing universities are to stand up to China, says Kerry Brown, director of the Lau China Institute at King's College London. The lse depends on foreign students, who count for 68% of

those at the university (some 11% of the total number are Chinese). And the university already has an awkward history of foreign entanglements. In 2008 it awarded a phd to Saif Qaddafi, son of Muammar, the late Libyan tyrant, after accepting a £1.5m (\$2.9m) donation from his foundation.

China is likely to be a source of angst for many more British universities in years to come. Along with Australia, Canada and America, Britain has benefited from the country's growing appetite for foreign education. The depreciation of the pound since the Brexit referendum in 2016 has provided an additional boost; British universities are now "quite a good bargain for Chinese students", says Yinbo Yu, the international officer at Britain's National Union of Students. In the past decade the number of Chinese students has more than tripled, with 76,425 starting a degree last year (see chart).

Like their classmates, most Chinese students just want to study and have fun. A minority, though, see themselves as "an extension of the party state", says Steve Tsang, director of the China Institute at soas. In 2017 students and the Chinese embassy protested against a debate at Durham University entitled, "This house sees China as a threat to the West", as well as the participation of a supporter of Falun Gong, a sect outlawed in China. Chinese students' associations at some universities are believed to keep an eye on those who head overseas. "There is a fear on the part of Chinese students that anything they do or say could be reported and influence their future," says Charles Parton of the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank.

The presence of students also grants the Chinese government leverage over universities. When Louise Richardson, vice-chancellor of Oxford University, was asked by the Chinese embassy to prevent Lord Patten, the university's chancellor (a largely ceremonial role), from visiting Hong Kong, she refused. Not all administrators are so steadfast. Mr Tsang says officials at another leading university attempted to get a speaker disinvited from an event after pressure from the embassy. Last summer an academic was removed from the management board of Nottingham University's campus in Ningbo, a city on China's eastern seaboard, after writing an essay critical of the 19th Communist Party Congress, a meeting of government bigwigs.

British universities have worked hard to court the Chinese, and the rush of students paying hefty international fees demonstrates the benefits of this approach. But as the Ise is now finding out, it is not without drawbacks. When threatened with receiving fewer Chinese students by the Chinese embassy, Ms Richardson of Oxford replied that there were many Indians who would be happy to take their place. The same is surely true at the Ise, one of the world's leading academic institutions. It might just want to think carefully about what colour it shades Kashmir.

This article appeared in the Britain section of the print edition under the headline "Art attack"

From: [Shafik Minoche](#)
To: [Mckibbin, C](#)
Cc: [Boas, LV](#)
Subject: FW: Remind for registration - Invitation for the 2019 CSSA-UK New Year Gala
Date: 11 January 2019 17:03:00

Just a reminder if we could find someone on SMC to attend.

From: events@edu-chineseembassy-uk.org
Sent: 11 January 2019 16:56
Subject: Remind for registration - Invitation for the 2019 CSSA-UK New Year Gala

Dear guests,

With the end of Christmas and New Year holidays, we kindly remind you to confirm your attendance to the 2019 CSSA-UK New Year Gala and Reception as early as possible.

We look forward to meeting you on Monday Jan. 28th at the Sadler's Wells Theatre, Rosebery Ave, Clerkenwell, London EC1R 4TN. And the online registration via <https://goo.gl/forms/biahIN8SGliVhtAy2> will be postponed to 17:00 Jan 18th .

Should you have any enquiries, please feel free to contact us.

Kind regards,

Event team
Education Section
Chinese Embassy in the U.K.

[xxxxx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxx](#)

From: [Hix.S](#)
To: [SMC-list](#)
Subject: FW: Scholars-at-Risk-Obstacles-to-Excellence_EN
Date: 24 September 2019 15:24:36
Attachments: [Scholars-at-Risk-Obstacles-to-Excellence_EN.pdf](#)

Dear Colleagues,

Further to our discussion about our relations with China, Chris Hughes has just sent me this, attached, which is a report by Scholars at Risk on "Academic Freedom and China's Quest for World-Class Universities". I thought I should share this, as SAR are a credible organisation.

Best wishes,
Simon

From: [Shafik.Minouche](#)
To: [Fung,Dilly](#); [Mckibbin,C](#)
Cc: [Ross,LV](#); [Worrell,M](#)
Subject: Fwd: Invitation for the 2019 CSSA-UK New Year Gala
Date: 06 January 2019 10:38:41
Attachments: [Invitation-Minouche Shafik.pdf](#)
[The 2019 CSSA-UK Chinese New Year Gala.pdf](#)

Could we check if Silly would like to attend on LSE's behalf?

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: 活 <@>
Sent: Friday, January 4, 2019 2:07 am
To: Shafik,Minouche
Subject: Invitation for the 2019 CSSA-UK New Year Gala

Dear Dame Minouche Shafik,

To celebrate the 2019 Chinese Spring Festival, it is our great pleasure to invite you to the CSSA-UK Chinese New Year Gala on Monday Jan. 28th, 2019 at the Sadler's Wells Theatre, Rosebery Ave, Clerkenwell, London EC1R 4TN.

The event will start with an exclusive reception at 18:00 for our important partners from the British governmental departments, universities and other stakeholders from the education sector. And the Gala will commence afterwards at 19:30 with variety of spectacular shows. The Ambassador will deliver his new year address at the beginning of the second part of the performance at 20:30.

Attached please find the invitation and information about the event. And we very much appreciate if you could R.S.V.P. by 10h January via: <https://goo.gl/forms/biahJNBSGLiVHtAy2>

On behalf of Mr. Wang Yongli, Minister Counsellor for Education, we wish to express our sincere gratefulness for your supports in the last year and look forward to meeting you in January.

Yours sincerely,

Event team
Education Section
Chinese Embassy in the U.K.

From: [Hix,S](#)
To: [SMC-list](#)
Subject: Fwd: IJ Kevin Carrico in Foreign Policy on university inaction towards Chinese student attempts to block HK students' expression
Date: 12 August 2019 15:10:39

Dear Colleagues,

Chris Hughes sent me this, below. Perhaps something we need to keep an eye on in the coming months.

Best wishes,
Simon

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Hughes,CR" <x.x.xxxxxx@xxx.xx.xx>
Date: 11 August 2019 at 00:05:58 GMT-7
To: "Hix,S" <x.xxx@xxx.xx.x>
Subject: IJ Kevin Carrico in Foreign Policy on university inaction towards Chinese student attempts to block HK students' expression

Dear Simon

I am concerned about the possibility of frictions between students over HK when term begins. This article by Kevin Carrico at Monash makes some useful suggestions.

All the best
Chris

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/09/universities-are-turning-a-blind-eye-to-chinese-bullies/>

Universities Are Turning a Blind Eye to Chinese Bullies

Mainland thuggery against Hong Kongers is being
extended to foreign campuses.

BY [KEVIN CARRICO](#) | AUGUST 9, 2019, 3:19
PM

I am not prone to naive optimism. But I must admit that I felt unusually hopeful standing on Monash University's campus outside Melbourne, Australia, on the chilly afternoon of Aug. 6, watching students from across the Hong Kong-China divide engage in open and rational discussion of Hong Kong's unfolding crisis.

Over the past two weeks, pro-Chinese Communist Party students in Australia and New Zealand, where mainlanders make up at least 30 percent of overseas students, had engaged in a series of violent outbursts against protesters voicing support for the Hong Kong struggle. The confrontations stretched from the [University of Queensland](#) to [Auckland](#), New Zealand, with counterprotesters pushing fellow students; [tearing away](#) protest signs; [destroying](#) Lennon walls, first [created](#) during the Occupy protests of 2014, where anyone can use Post-it notes to share their thoughts; and [engaging](#) in doxxing and [threats](#) against anyone with different opinions. Brazenly adding fuel to the fire, Chinese consulates have [openly](#) voiced their [support](#) for such thuggish behavior, while universities have, shamefully, taken no action against the offenders.

In such an [openly hostile](#) environment, Hong Kong students at Monash were understandably anxious about holding an event in support of the struggle back home, but they also refused to be scared into silence. Donning the facemasks, safety goggles, and hard hats that have come to represent the movement, students set up a mobile Lennon wall on Tuesday, handing out fliers and encouraging passersby to share their thoughts on Post-it notes.

I watched the protest from the sidelines much of the afternoon and was pleasantly surprised to see calm and rational discussion. There were students from China who disagreed with the impetus of the protests, but they shared their thoughts in peaceful and open dialogue. Was I witnessing an elusive moment of genuine communicative reason?

This fleeting optimism was, however, unwarranted. A small gang, caricatures of the so-called angry youth cultivated through patriotic education in China, soon came sauntering in our direction. One of them immediately placed his mobile phone on the ground in front of the protesters as it played the national anthem of the People's Republic of China.

I watched perplexedly as the patriots failed to sing along with the anthem, as legislation currently under

consideration in Hong Kong would [require](#) students to do as part of school curricula, only managing to shout in unison the final lines, “March on! March on! March on!” The next hour of harassment and intimidation laid bare the fundamental (and fundamentally flawed) logics of contemporary Chinese authoritarian nationalism on the global stage.

First, volume is key. “Hong Kong is part of China, isn’t it? Isn’t it? Hong Kong has always been a part of China and always will be part of China.” Such declarations of absolute ownership, shouted in close proximity, overlook the realities of history, wherein it was precisely Hong Kong’s separation from China that allowed it to develop into the dynamic city that it is today. An inverse relationship is apparent between the soundness of an argument and the volume at which it is delivered, aiming not so much at winning hearts and minds as overpowering eardrums.

Second, victimization is your best friend. Despite being the aggressors in this case, invading protesters’ personal space and menacingly shouting people down, the patriots perpetually framed themselves as victims. Citing an earlier incident in which a group of protesters in Hong Kong threw the Chinese flag into Victoria Harbor, the loudest of the patriots demanded answers from the Melbourne-based protesters for this offense, as if they had personally grabbed the flag from his hands: “Answer my question, are you on the same side as those people who threw our flag into the harbor?” Such accusations and pre-emptive self-victimization in turn provided cover for such blatantly threatening comments from the Chinese students as “We Chinese just want Hong Kong’s land, we don’t care about the people” and “We’ll upload video of this to Weibo, then see if you all are still alive tomorrow.”

Third, nationalism eats its own. “We are all Chinese” is not a statement of solidarity but rather a threat to embrace a particular ideological line based not in reason but in imposed identity. While the Hong Kong students were the main targets for harassment, particularly venomous hatred was reserved for fellow Chinese who failed to adopt a suitably hostile stance. In a moment that highlighted the troubling intersection of authoritarian nationalism and sexism, one student from the province of Sichuan who was speaking with protesters rather than yelling at them was shouted down as a “Sichuan sister” who “needs to be reported to the consulate.” The assembled group of patriots laughed as this student shook her head and stared down at the ground. Images of this

student continue to circulate on Chinese social media today, with threats to report her to the authorities “in every province.”

When discussing such unabashed nationalist thuggery, I am often asked whether I think the students were taking orders from the Chinese Consulate. Beijing has played a role in mobilizing student protesters abroad before, most [notoriously](#) in 2008. And its embassies in both [Australia](#) and [New Zealand](#) have in recent weeks voiced their support in Chinese-language postings for violent acts against peaceful protesters—I am certainly not about to give them the benefit of the doubt. Yet the assumption that such ignorant behavior is directly dictated by the consulate is not always correct. Sometimes it’s a comforting story that we tell ourselves to avoid reckoning with the real, violent nationalism enacted by some Chinese students.

Such violence may in fact emerge spontaneously from genuinely held beliefs, no matter how misinformed those beliefs may be. After all, if your nation is threatened by silent protesters holding Post-it notes thousands of miles away, perhaps it is not all that strong. Yet one does not have to be correct to act with deep conviction. Such violence can also have careerist motivations, obviously directed toward an audience back in China—“put it up on Weibo,” as the gang said—or could just be an easy way to displace other frustrations. The picture is even less clear for bystanders: Those who stand by and cheer on such thuggery could genuinely think that unleashing violence against anyone critical of the CCP is a great idea, or they could simply be operating under a most insidious form of peer pressure, knowing that even in Australia one’s every act or word is potentially monitored by the CCP state.

Whatever the motivations, if any other group of students engaged in this type of intimidation, there would be genuine outrage and consequences. And if we reframe the Hong Kong struggle as a fundamentally anti-colonial struggle against the new metropole of Beijing, no university could countenance students from the colonizing center surrounding, shouting down, and threatening students from a colony.

However, whether due to economic concerns over alienating one of their most profitable sources of students, misplaced ideological frames, or a simple lack of understanding of the relationship between Hong Kong and China, from Queensland to

Melbourne to Auckland, there is no sign of any university administration taking steps to respond to this ongoing wave of intimidation, harassment, and violence. In a twisted example of “Western” political correctness empowering the CCP’s version, there have even been [calls](#) for protesters to recognize that Lennon walls make some students “uncomfortable.”

Such abandonment of principles sends the wrong message to the patriotic provocateurs, who come to believe that they can extraterritorially deny fellow students’ freedoms without any consequences, just because they pay tuition: As one student [dismantling](#) a Lennon wall at the University of Queensland said on video to a university security guard, “Try calling the police. I’ll call the embassy.” Universities’ weak stance also hurts students from Hong Kong, China, Tibet, and Xinjiang who have come to Australia in search of the freedoms of speech and association that are either rapidly disappearing or already nonexistent at home. When students are more scared to protest in Melbourne today than in the emerging police state in Hong Kong, something is deeply wrong.

Universities need to take a two-tiered approach to these increasingly deeply entrenched trends. Clearly, orientation sessions for students from backgrounds that do not respect civil liberties need to emphasize the supreme importance of freedoms of thought, speech, and association as cornerstones of the university experience: The CCP’s crimes, Hong Kong’s legally guaranteed freedoms, and even Hong Kong independence are all topics that can be openly discussed.

Yet as a professor, I’m well aware that students aren’t always listening when you deliver a lecture to them. Given there are real incentives for such patriotic thuggery, there needs to be real disincentives. Universities need to begin handing out real punishments, in accordance with university policy, to students who threaten others. Police must also investigate and where appropriate prosecute any cases in which there is evidence of threats, doxxing, violence, or coordination with consulates. Finally, diplomats who encourage the violent suppression of basic freedoms should be condemned and expelled, not [given](#) visiting professorships, as the University of Queensland has given Chinese Consul-General Xu Jie.

Taking a hard and consistent line is the only way that Australia and other countries can reassure students

seeking refuge from increasingly aggressive CCP repression that universities will not provide a safe space for authoritarian bullying and violence.

Kevin Carrico
Senior Lecturer, Chinese Studies
Monash

From: 活
To: [Shafik.Minouche](#)
Subject: Invitation for the 2019 CSSA-UK New Year Gala
Date: 04 January 2019 02:07:27
Attachments: [Invitation-Minouche Shafik.pdf](#)
[The 2019 CSSA-UK Chinese New Year Gala.pdf](#)

Dear Dame Minouche Shafik,

To celebrate the 2019 Chinese Spring Festival, it is our great pleasure to invite you to the CSSA-UK Chinese New Year Gala on Monday Jan. 28th, 2019 at the Sadler's Wells Theatre, Rosebery Ave, Clerkenwell, London EC1R 4TN.

The event will start with an exclusive reception at 18:00 for our important partners from the British governmental departments, universities and other stakeholders from the education sector. And the Gala will commence afterwards at 19:30 with variety of spectacular shows. The Ambassador will deliver his new year address at the beginning of the second part of the performance at 20:30.

Attached please find the invitation and information about the event. And we very much appreciate if you could R.S.V.P. by 10h January via: <https://goo.gl/forms/biahJNBSGlivHtAy2>

On behalf of Mr. Wang Yongli, Minister Counsellor for Education, we wish to express our sincere gratefulness for your supports in the last year and look forward to meeting you in January.

Yours sincerely,

Event team
Education Section
Chinese Embassy in the U.K.



On the Occasion of the 70th Anniversary of
the Founding of the People's Republic of China

H.E. Ambassador Liu Xiaoming and Madam Hu Pinghua

request the pleasure of the company of

Minouche Shafik

at a Reception on Monday 9th September 2019
at Guildhall, Gresham Street, London EC2V 7HH

R.S.V.P. by email to rsvp.political@gmail.com by 23rd August

Lounge Suit

18:30 Drinks

19:00 Speeches

This event is by invitation only. Please bring this card and photo ID with you.

Security check may apply at the entrance.

From: [Shafik.Minouche](#)
To: [REDACTED] [Director](#)
Cc: [xxxx@xxxx.xxx](#); [Gajewska.M](#)
Subject: Re: An Invitation from LSE Honorary Doctorate Recipient Emily Lau, JP to Discuss Hong Kong Situation
Date: 06 May 2019 10:39:52

Thank you for your kind message. I am afraid I am doing back-to-back graduation ceremonies from 22-24 July but it may be possible to meet on 25 July. I am copying Marta in my office for you to follow up and find a mutually convenient time. Best wishes,

Minouche

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, May 6, 2019 1:15 am
To: Director; Shafik,Minouche
Cc: [xxxx@xxxx.xxx](#)
Subject: An Invitation from LSE Honorary Doctorate Recipient Emily Lau, JP to Discuss Hong Kong Situation

Dear Director Shafik,

I am [REDACTED] a postgraduate at the London School of Economics and Political Science. I am writing on behalf of my LSE mentor Ms Emily Lau, to extend an invitation to discuss Hong Kong situation with you and Tom Tugendhat, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee at House of Commons on the 22nd July. Ms Emily Lau has been invited by you to attend the presentation ceremony on the 23rd July to receive her LSE honorary doctoral degree.

Lord Chris Patten regarded Ms Lau as a "professional politician, handsome, well informed and dashing eloquent, who would have got to the top in any Western political system" and an "exponent of the incisive soundbite". Therefore, he awarded a Justice of the Peace to Emily, who was elected to the Hong Kong lawmaking body the Legislative Council for seven terms, from 1991 to 2016 and was elected chairperson of the Democratic Party from 2012 to 2016.

The latest report "China and the Rules-Based International System" by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee states that, "We support the FCO's efforts, recognising the UK's commitments under international law, in drawing attention to threats to Hong Kong's autonomy, including via the Six-Monthly Reports to Parliament." Ms Lau also believes that, "Parliament should send a strong message to the Chinese government urging them not to renege on the Joint Declaration and Basic Law, keep the promises of 'One Country, Two Systems' and stop interfering in Hong Kong affairs" in her submission to the UK Parliament

Joint Committee on Human Rights (attached).

Ms Lau is available from the 21st to the 25th July. Are you available to join our meeting with Mr Tugendhat? If not, could you please let us know if you are happy to meet up and when you are available? I have cc'ed Ms Lau on this email. Many thanks for your attention.

Warmest regards,

[REDACTED]

MSc in [REDACTED]
London School of Economics and Political Science

From: WALKER, Janet <xxxxx.xxxxxx@xxxxxxxxxx.xx>

Sent: 12 April 2019 13:15

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: xxxx@xxxx.xxx

Subject: RE: An Invitation from Ms Emily Lau to Discuss Hong Kong Situation with the Chair and Specialists of the Foreign Affairs Committee

Thanks [REDACTED]

And do, please, call me Janet

Please note that Tom's office is NOT in Portcullis House but in the Palace. The best entrance to use will be Cromwell Green entrance, which is directly opposite Westminster Abbey. You will need to proceed down the ramp and clear airport-style security which can take a little while, so please allow for this. Once you have been cleared, please ask staff to direct you to Central Lobby, and on arrival at Central Lobby ask reception to call me on extension 0576 and I will come and collect you.

Finally, I must make the proviso that Parliamentary business can raise its head at the last minute and I may need to reschedule the meeting. It would be extremely helpful if you were to offer me your mobile phone number so that if this does occur I can give you as much advance warning as possible. Might you send this on, please?

I look forward to hearing from you.

Best wishes,
Janet

Janet Walker
Office of Tom Tugendhat MBE MP
Member of Parliament for Tonbridge and Malling
House of Commons
London SW1A 0AA
E: xxxxx.xxxxxx@xxxxxxxxxx.xx
T: 020 7219 0576

To subscribe to Tom's regular newsletters click [here](#)

To view Tom's privacy notice and data protection policy, please click [here](#)

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: 12 April 2019 11:24

To: WALKER, Janet <xxxxx.xxxxxx@xxxxxxxxxx.xx>

Cc: xxxx@xxxx.xxx

Subject: Re: An Invitation from Ms Emily Lau to Discuss Hong Kong Situation with the Chair and Specialists of the Foreign Affairs Committee

Dear Ms Walker,

Thank you very much for your email.

Ms Emily Lau and I would be happy to meet with Mr Tugendhat at the House of Commons on Monday 22 July 1600-1630. Could you please offer guidance on where to arrive? Many thanks!

Warmest regards,

[REDACTED]

From: WALKER, Janet <xxxxx.xxxxxx@xxxxxxxxxx.xx>

Sent: 12 April 2019 10:44

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: xxxx@xxxx.xxx

Subject: FW: An Invitation from Ms Emily Lau to Discuss Hong Kong Situation with the Chair and Specialists of the Foreign Affairs Committee

Dear [REDACTED]

Thank you for your email to Mr Tugendhat.

He would be happy to see you and Ms Lau when she visits London in July. Might I offer a meeting here at the House of Commons on Monday 22 July 1600-1630? If this suits, please let me know and I will offer guidance on where to arrive.

With best wishes

Janet

Janet Walker
Office of Tom Tugendhat MBE MP
Member of Parliament for Tonbridge and Malling
House of Commons
London SW1A 0AA
E: xxxxx.xxxxxx@xxxxxxxxxx.xx

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From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 09 April 2019 07:43
To: Foreign Affairs Committee <xxx@xxxxxxxxxx.xx>
Cc: xxxx@xxxx.xxx
Subject: An Invitation from Ms Emily Lau to Discuss Hong Kong Situation with the Chair and Specialists of the Foreign Affairs Committee

Dear Chair and Specialists of the Foreign Affairs Committee,

I am [REDACTED], a postgraduate at the London School of Economics and Political Science. I am writing on behalf of my LSE mentor Ms Emily Lau, to extend an invitation to discuss Hong Kong situation with the Chair and Specialists of the Foreign Affairs Committee in London in July. Ms Emily Lau was elected to the Hong Kong lawmaking body the Legislative Council for seven terms, from 1991 to 2016 and was elected chairperson of the Democratic Party from 2012 to 2016.

The latest report "China and the Rules-Based International System" by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee states that, "We support the FCO's efforts, recognising the UK's commitments under international law, in drawing attention to threats to Hong Kong's autonomy, including via the Six-Monthly Reports to Parliament." Ms Lau also believes

that, "Parliament should send a strong message to the Chinese government urging them not to renege on the Joint Declaration and Basic Law, keep the promises of 'One Country, Two Systems' and stop interfering in Hong Kong affairs" in her submission to the UK Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights (attached).

Ms Emily Lau has been invited by LSE Director Dame Minouche Shafik to attend the presentation ceremony on the 23rd July to receive her LSE honorary doctoral degree. She is also the first woman in Hong Kong and Asia to receive this honor, which is conferred only on individuals who have demonstrated outstanding achievement and distinction in a field or activity consonant with the work of LSE and with its mission to improve society and understand the "causes of things". Ms Lau is available from the 21st to the 25th July. Could you please let Ms Lau know if the Chair and Specialists of the Foreign Affairs Committee are happy to meet up and when you are available? I have cc'ed Ms Lau on this email. Many thanks for your attention.

Warmest regards,

[REDACTED]

MSc in [REDACTED]
London School of Economics and Political Science

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From: [events](#)
To: [Shafik.Minouche](#)
Subject: Reception Invitation on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the founding of P.R. China
Date: 14 August 2019 11:09:24
Attachments: [Minouche-Shafik.pdf](#)

Dear Prof. Minouche Shafik,

Greetings from the Education Section of the Chinese Embassy in London!

Attached please find the Invitation to a Reception to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of P.R. China from H.E. Ambassador Liu Xiaoming and Madam Hu Pinghua at 18:30 on Monday 9th September 2019.

Please kindly reply to confirm your attendance or not by email to: events@edu-chineseembassy-uk.org , meanwhile copy your reply email to: rspv.politic@.
by 23rd August.

Upon receiving confirmation of your attendance, we 'll send you the printed invitation card which you need to bring with you for the reception by mail, so please kindly attach your postal address as well.

Thank you very much for your kind attention and we look forward to your reply.

Best regards,

Events Team

Ruan Shao
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 | **events**

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From: xxxxxx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxx
Subject: Remind for registration - Invitation for the 2019 CSSA-UK New Year Gala
Date: 11 January 2019 17:01:19

Dear guests,

With the end of Christmas and New Year holidays, we kindly remind you to confirm your attendance to the 2019 CSSA-UK New Year Gala and Reception as early as possible.

We look forward to meeting you on Monday Jan. 28th at the Sadler's Wells Theatre, Rosebery Ave, Clerkenwell, London EC1R 4TN. And the online registration via <https://goo.gl/forms/biahJNBsGtiVHtAy2> will be postponed to 17:00 Jan 18th .

Should you have any enquiries, please feel free to contact us.

Kind regards,

Event team
Education Section
Chinese Embassy in the U.K.

xxxxx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxx

LSE and China – Our Engagement as of June 2019

Purpose of Paper and Contents

The paper outlines LSE's engagement with China. It is deliberately descriptive, rather than discussing strategy, providing a **snapshot of our engagement with China as of June 2019**. However, given the paper is about China, and given the level of LSE's activity in China, an overview of the main risks for the School in China is provided in Annex Two, for interested readers.

The paper provides 1) an historical overview of the relationship with China, 2) an executive summary with a series of fast-facts on LSE and China, 3) details on LSE student, alumni and faculty, 3) LSE academic programmes in and with China, 4) LSE public engagement in China, 5) LSE philanthropy in China, and 6) LSE executive education in and with China.

Historical Overview

LSE has a long history of engagement with China. In 1911 and 1912 LSE founders Sidney and Beatrice Webb visited China and Japan, as well as Southeast Asia, as part of a long tour through the region. Students from China began enrolling at the School by the end of that decade. George Bernard Shaw visited China in 1933 and met with the famed Chinese poet, Lu Xun; President of what is now, Peking University, Cai Yuanpei; and the Chinese political figure, Madam Soong Qingling, who would go on to become Vice President of China in 1949, and who was the wife of Sun Yat-sen one of the leaders of the 1911 revolution ending imperial rule (Qing Dynasty) in China and creating the Republic of China. LSE Economic Historian Prof. Richard Henry Tawney also carried out an extensive study in China in the early 1930s leading to his later book on *Life and Labour in China*.

As with other parts of the world, LSE graduates returned to China and have played major roles in shaping Chinese society. Fei Xiaotong (1910-2005) completed his PhD at LSE in 1938 under the founding father of Anthropology, Prof. Malinowski. Fei went on to create the first departments of sociology and anthropology in China, at Peking University, as well as writing the seminal work on social and economic reforms in China in his 1939 publication *Peasant Life in China*. Prof. Fei was made an Honorary Fellow of LSE. One of China's leading international jurists Wang Tieya (1913-2003) was also an alumnus of LSE. Prof. Harold Laski's work at LSE also heavily influenced intellectual debate in China. In more recent times, Prof. Anthony Giddens's work on the "Third Way" was very popular in social and political debate in China, and also within the Communist Party on alternative paths to reform and opening up.

In the 1970s, discussions between UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai lead to the arrival from 1974 to 1979 of a group of dynamic young Chinese officials to the LSE to undertake overseas studies. It was the first of its kind for Chinese students after the Cultural Revolution. LSE was chosen for its "leftist tendencies", after Oxford and Cambridge were firmly ruled out by the Chinese government. Our most senior alumnus in China dates from this group from the mid-1970s. Mr. Yang Jiechi is a member of the Politburo (22 persons committee),

and current Director of the Office of the Central Leading Group on Foreign Affairs at the State Council. Mr. Yang served as a State Councilor and Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs before then. He studied at LSE in 1974 and was made an Honorary Fellow of LSE during a ceremony in Beijing in March 2010.

From the mid-1980s onwards with the extension of the prestigious FCO Chevening Scholarship, Chinese student numbers to LSE began to rise. By the late 1990s the gradual rise in applications began to take off. From around 2006 onwards, LSE Graduate Admissions began to use a series of rankings of Chinese universities to assist academics in their selection process of Chinese students. From Summer 2003, the then (outgoing) LSE Director Prof. Anthony Giddens and LSE Deputy Director for Research and External Affairs, Prof. Henrietta Moore, launched the School's current institutional level strategy and engagement with both China and India. The initial focus was around developing academic partners, with the Summer School in Beijing starting in 2004. Over the years the academic programmes developed, and around these grew related projects serving students, alumni and faculty, and bringing LSE ideas to a larger audience in China.

Executive Summary - Fast facts and Numbers on LSE and China

- LSE has **2** institutional Academic Partners in China, out of a total of **7** global partners - **Peking University** (Beijing) and **Fudan University** (Shanghai).
- LSE has **5** double-degrees at Master level (international affairs; government; media and communications; financial statistics; and global political economy) with China, with another **2** double master degrees to launch, in 2020, in geography and environment and social policy.
- **1538** Chinese students enrolled to study at LSE in 2018-2019, the single largest group of international (non-UK) students at the School, making up over **12%** of the student body.
- **Over 7000** LSE alumni are resident in China and a further **3200** in Hong Kong. Alumni chapters exist in cities across China. **1000+** alumni are added to the PR China group on a yearly basis, one of the fastest growing groups for LSE.
- The **Yangtze Theatre** in the newly opened CBR was named through a gift from **7 Chinese alumni**, signifying the growth of philanthropic giving from China in the coming decades.
- Around **40** LSE faculty are engaged on China related research. (Names and details in Annex One)
- Over **2000** people attend LSE China public events each year, including the LSE China Conference: LSE China Graduation Ceremony; LSE China Lecture Series and LSE China Careers Fairs.
- **2** LSE degree programmes **modules** are delivered **independently** in China - TRIUM EMBA and Executive Global Masters in Management.
- LSE's **1st new 4-year degree** undergraduate programme, **with a built-in study abroad**, is the **BSc International Relations and Chinese**, with students spending their 3rd year at Fudan University, Shanghai. New undergraduate **collaborative degrees** are under discussion in management with Peking University.
- **2018** and **2019** Chinese corporates, particularly, banking institutions, begin working with LSE on custom executive programmes, as well as our open enrolment programmes.

China – Students, Alumni and Faculty

Students

The single largest group of students at LSE, outside of the UK, are Chinese students, by a long way. In 2018-2019 LSE had a total of **1538** Chinese students, with 968 on taught Master programmes, 56 on research degrees (primarily PhDs), and 514 undergraduate students. In 2018-2019, Chinese students accounted for approximately **12%** of the LSE student body. The next largest group is from the USA, with 889 students in 2018-2019. Further details immediately below.

Applications and Offers from China (T - “Taught”; R - “Research”; App – “Applications”)

	Postgrad T - App	Postgrad R - APP	Undergrad - App	Offers Post T	Offers – Post R	Offers – Under
2019-20	9032	201	2368	1951	18	463
2018-19	8290	175	1776	1675	19	444
2017-18	7397	124	1441	1691	20	326

Registered Chinese Students at LSE (T denotes “Taught”; R denotes “Research”)

	Postgrad T	New Research Student	New Undergrad	Total Undergrad	Total Postgrad R	Total Chinese Students
2018- 19	968	15	226	514	56	1538
2017- 18	942	14	165	392	53	1387

Alumni

There are 7000+ alumni resident in China and a further 3200+ in Hong Kong. There are active alumni organisations, with events and regular contact, mentoring and career development support in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Chengdu, and Hangzhou (Zhejiang). There is also an LSE Friends of Hong Kong Group.

Faculty

Approximately 40 LSE faculty are engaged (have recently been engaged) on working on research on China. Rather than highlighting specific individuals, an overview of those faculty and their general area of work is provided **Annex One**.

LSE Academic Programmes in and with China

Academic Partners

Two of LSE's seven global institutional partners are Chinese universities - **Peking University** (PKU) and **Fudan University** (Shanghai). The School also has a range of academic links with **Tsinghua University** (Beijing). Individual LSE academics work on collaborative research projects with Chinese academics at these universities and many other leading universities in China. The list below focuses on our collaborative projects, rather than individual academic links.

LSE and Peking University

LSE-Peking University Summer School

2019 is the 16th year of the programme. 2-week intensive programme with 13 courses for coming August 2019. Around 480+ students from 40+ countries are expected and will be taught by LSE and PKU faculty, in Beijing.

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/study-at-lse/Summer-Schools/lse-pku-summer-school>

LSE-PKU Double Degree Master in International Affairs

This degree was launched in 2006/07. The first year is spent at the School of International Studies at PKU, studying the international relations of China and the Asia Pacific region. The second year is spent at LSE, studying the theory and history of global international relations. 2 master degrees awarded. Around 30 students per cohort, from China and across the world.¹ (Approx. 30% PRC nationals)

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/study-at-lse/Graduate/Degree-programmes-2019/LSE-PKU-Double-MSc-Degree-in-International-Affairs>

LSE-PKU Double Masters in Public Administration and Government

This double degree was launched in 2010, with the first year at PKU School of Government studying on Chinese politics and policy, and the second year at LSE on public policy and administration. 2 master degrees awarded. Students on the programme come from China and around the world. (approximately 25-30% of students are PRC nationals)

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/study-at-lse/Graduate/Degree-programmes-2019/LSE-PKU-Double-Degree-in-Public-Administration-and-Government>

¹ The target number for nearly all the double Master degrees is **15 students per cohort** unless otherwise stated. Programmes usually reach this target, slightly over-recruiting by 1 or so a yearly basis. New programmes, in the very first year of recruitment, may not always reach the target number, under and over-shooting as admission specialists calibrate the likely turn-up rate for offer holders.

LSE-PKU Double Masters in Environmental Management, Technology and Health (Awaiting Approval for a student quota from APRC. GSSC approved in May 2019)

Students from China and around the world will study on an integrated social science and science platform, with a focus on environmental issues, particularly related to health. One-year study at the College of Environmental Science and Engineering at Peking University, and a second year of study at the Department of Geography & Environment at LSE. Two Master degrees, one from each institution.

LSE-PKU Undergraduate Collaboration in Global Management (Under Planning)

LSE Department of Management and Peking University's Guanghua School of Management are in discussions on:-

1. PKU Guanghua School of Management to possibly join LSE Dept. of Management's global exchange network for undergraduate students, which already includes Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, University of Michigan, Wharton, UPenn, HEC, Bocconi, and St. Gallen.
2. A **3+2 sandwich 5-year undergraduate programme** leading to undergraduate degrees from LSE and PKU. Initially, this is administratively easier to deliver than a **4-year undergraduate degree** leading to two Bachelor degrees in Management from LSE and Guanghua School of Management at Peking University. Both programmes would aim to bring together top Chinese students and international students. The objective is to have students understand "East" and "West" business culture from an early age i.e. the undergraduate level. Students would also spend up to 6 months in Shenzhen working on "New Economy - China and the World" with internships/work experience in leading Global Chinese tech companies.

PhD Mobility Programme

LSE and Peking University students in doctoral level studies apply on an exchange programme, with supervisor support, as part of their PhD studies at their home institution.

LSE-Fudan University

LSE-Fudan Double Masters in Global Media and Communications

This double-degree was launched in 2008, with the first year of study in London at LSE's Department of Media and Communications and the second year at Fudan's School of Journalism. Students for this programme come from China and across the globe. 2 master degrees awarded after 2 years.

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/study-at-lse/Graduate/Degree-programmes-2019/MSc-Global-Media-and-Communications-LSE-and-Fudan>

LSE-Fudan Double Masters in Chinese Economy and Financial Statistics (launches with first students in London in September 2019)

The two-year programme is between LSE's Department of Statistics and Fudan's School of Economics combining financial quantitative work at LSE, in year one, with a focus on economics and business in China in year two. Students graduate with two Master level degrees from LSE and Fudan. Students will include Chinese and international students.

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/study-at-lse/Graduate/Degree-programmes-2019/LSE-Fudan-MSc-Financial-Statistics-Chinese-Economy>

LSE-Fudan Double Masters in Global Political Economy: China and Europe (launches with first students in London in September 2019)

The two-year programme is between LSE's European Institute and Fudan's Institute of Global Public Policy. The objective is for a greater understanding on political economy between China and Europe, with students undertaking a capstone project on political economy in year one at LSE, and in year 2 in Shanghai, focusing on China's international economic engagement, particularly through international and regional organisations.

Students will come from China and the rest of the world.

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/study-at-lse/Graduate/Degree-programmes-2019/LSE-Fudan-Double-Degree-in-the-Global-Political-Economy-of-China-and-Europe>

LSE-Fudan Double Masters in Global Social Policy (launches 2020 with first enrolment in London)

Students from China and around the world will study on international social policy, with a focus on the UK and Europe during year one at the Department of Social Policy at LSE, and on Chinese social issues and policies during year two at the School of Social Development and Public Policy at Fudan University. The objective is to develop a cohort of social policy experts with an understanding of social policy issues and challenges globally and in China. Two Master degrees, one from each institution.

LSE-Fudan Research Centre for Global Public Policy (Shanghai and London) – Launched in Shanghai on 26 May 2019

A joint research centre in Shanghai, hosted by the Institute for Global Public Policy at Fudan, with a corresponding research hub at the School of Public Policy at LSE. Fellows in London and Shanghai working on the broad theme of global public policy and China.

Fudan PhD Mobility Programme

LSE and Fudan University students on doctoral level studies apply on an exchange programme, with supervisor support, as part of their PhD studies at their home institution.

LSE-Fudan - Intensive Summer Mandarin Programme in Shanghai

LSE Mandarin speaking students attend an intense custom programme in Chinese language at Fudan University over a 5-8 week period over Summer. Objective – to raise students language skills by one-level by the start of the new academic year at LSE each September.

LSE 100 Summer Course

Tailored 3-week programme for Tsinghua liberal arts students (20-25 students) and Fudan social science students (25-30) completed over the Summer at LSE.

Undergraduate Exchange in Anthropology

Fudan University's School of Social Development and Public Policy is part of the LSE Department of Anthropology's global network of universities where it engages on undergraduate exchange. The network also includes University of Tokyo and Melbourne University.

BSc International Relations and Chinese

This new undergraduate programme will start this coming September 2019 in London. The target for the first cohort is 12 students. 156 applications were received for this course, with 18 offer holders designating the programme as their preferred option. This is a **four-year degree programme**, with year 3 spent at Fudan, primarily on Mandarin study. Students return for year 4 in London to complete their studies. Students are expected to graduate as an IR specialist and fluent in Mandarin.

LSE – Tsinghua University

Confucius Institute for Business in London <http://www.cibl.ac.uk/>

Tsinghua University is the Chinese partner of the Confucius Institute for Business (CIBL) in London, with LSE. CIBL provides Chinese language courses, with a specific focus on business language courses for corporations in London/UK, and corresponding programmes in China. Founding corporate members include HSBC, Swire, BP, Deloitte, and Standard Chartered.

LSE 100 Spring Course

A one-week long programme for School of Finance students from Tsinghua University. 2019 was the pilot year for this programme, the reviews have been good from students, and Tsinghua would like to continue and grow this programme.

LSE 100 Summer Course

Tailored 3-week programme for Tsinghua liberal arts students (20-25 students) and Fudan social science students (25-30) completed over the Summer at LSE.

Global Alliance of Universities on Climate (Spring 2019 founding group meet)

LSE and Tsinghua University are founding members, along with others leading universities including MIT, Berkeley and Cambridge with the aim of greater collaboration on climate change and the promotion of environmental practices by universities in line with UN SDGs. Future research agenda and activities under development.

University of London - International Programme (Hong Kong and China)

University of Hong Kong

University of London undergraduate degrees delivered at the University of Hong Kong, with LSE providing academic direction in Economics, Finance and the Social Sciences.

Beijing Foreign Studies University

Planned launch in **2019/2020** of a University of London International Programme Centre at Beijing Foreign Studies University, with most of the undergraduate courses on offer through ULOiP as part of the Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences (EMFSS), led by LSE.

LSE Modules in China (Independently run directly by LSE in country)

TRIUM

TRIUM Shanghai Module is held each November in the city, over approximately a 9-10 day period. The module forms part of the TRIUM MBA degree.

Global Executive Masters in Management

From 2016, LSE Dept of Management runs an overseas module in Beijing for students on its Executive Global Master's in Management degree. The module in Beijing forms part of the overall degree.

LSE Public Engagement in China (Alumni and General Public)

LSE has an extensive programme of public engagement with China, including the following programmes and events.

Visiting Scholars Programme

The British Embassy Beijing funds a number of Chevening scholars from Chinese government departments to spend up to 9 months at LSE working on a research project and paper. The Visiting Scholars are hosted in appropriate academic departments or research centres. This funding from Chevening is further to the regular Chevening scholarships for Master level study at LSE for Chinese officials. The objective of the programme is to improve participating Chinese officials public policy skills. Officials have come from Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Leading group on Finance and Economics, State Council; Central Party School; International Department of Central Committee of CPC; People's Bank of China (The Green Finance Group); Shanghai Municipal Government; Provincial Governments in Guizhou.

LSE Careers fairs in China

Careers fairs for LSE Students and Alumni are held in Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong during the month of August each year. The objective is to give recent LSE alumni and graduating students access to leading international and local companies in China.

LSE Careers fairs in China started in 2006. In recent years, Careers fairs are held in co-operation with Imperial College London, and Cambridge, with their alumni also invited to attend. The rationale is to have a full range of companies attending, interested in graduates in social sciences, and also in engineering, sciences and medicine. From 2016, several leading US universities are invited to attend, on a fee-paying basis, and these have included Harvard, Columbia, MIT, and Chicago. These institutions do not have the student numbers to justify hosting their own Careers fairs. For LSE it is good brand association i.e. 3 leading UK universities, with several leading US institutions.

LSE China Conference

An annual event held in August each year, with over 300 attending. The conference was first held in 2011, after the success of the 2010 Asia Forum in Beijing, and as a way to have faculty who are in Beijing for the LSE-Peking University Summer School engage with the public in China on their current research on topical economic, social and political issues. The event is open to the public. Participants come from all over China, and beyond to attend the conference. LSE faculty speak on panels, with academics from other Chinese universities, and business and government leaders. Past speakers have included 1) **Yang Jiechi**, Foreign Minister of China (now State Councilor); 2) **Liu He**, then Vice Minister, Office of the Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs. (now Director, Financial Group General office); 3) **Jin Liqun**, then Chairman of Board of Supervisors, China Investment Corporation (now President of AIIB); 4) **Liu Mingkang**, then Chairman of China Banking Regulatory Commission; 5) **Stephen Roach**, then Chairman, Morgan

Stanley Asia; 6) **Hu Xiaolian**, then Deputy Governor of People's Bank of China; 7) **HRH Prince Andrew**, Duke of York, then UK's Special Representative for International Trade and Investment; 8) **Zhu Min**, then Deputy Governor of People's Bank of China; 9) Madam **Chen Lifang**, Corporate Senior Vice President and Director of the Board, Huawei; 10) **Tim Frost**, Founder and Director, Cairn Capital and Markit; 11) **David Barboza**, Pulitzer Prize Winning New York Times Journalist; and 12) **Zhang Weying**, Peking University (high profile out-spoken Chinese Economist)

LSE China Lecture Series

Lectures in Beijing and Shanghai from visiting LSE faculty and high-profile LSE alumni to China. LSE Alumni and Friends of LSE (non-alumni) attend these lectures. The most recent lecture in Beijing was in **April 2019** from **Prof. Naufel Vilcassim** from Department of Management and in Shanghai in **May 2019** from **Prof. Jin Keyu**, Department of Economics and **Prof. Tim Hildebrandt**, Department of Social Policy.

LSE China Graduation

A full LSE graduation ceremony has been held in Beijing since 2010. Close to 250 new graduands and their guests attend the annual event. LSE faculty in Beijing for the annual Summer School host the event. Simultaneous translation is provided for family members. The event introduces the new LSE graduates to alumni groups and the importance of maintaining links with the School.

LSE Generate – Innovation and Start-Up Hubs

Since the second half of 2018 LSE Generate has been working with municipal level government agencies to create dedicated support and opportunities for LSE alumni interested in creating and locating start-ups in China. To date, MoUs have been signed with OTEC (Overseas Talent Agency) in Beijing and the local government agency in Chengdu (Sichuan province) providing for co-working space, start-up support; investor introduction and support etc. for LSE alumni and their new business ventures. Initial discussions have also been held with the JinQiao Free Trade Zone in Shanghai.

High level visits – SMC, Council, Court

LSE Directors and Pro-Directors and other members of SMC, Council, and Court visit China on a regular to meet with academic partners, alumni, donors, government and business leaders, as well as headlining key events in the region e.g. LSE graduation in China, University of London International Programme graduations in SE Asia, or other events. For example, **Ben Plummer-Powell** visited in 2018; **Dilly Fung** will visit in August 2019, and **Minouche Shafik** in November 2019.

LSE Philanthropy in China

China and East Asia, in general, will be an important philanthropic market for LSE. Over the coming years China will have the largest number of philanthropists in the world, and many of them will be women.

Given the rapidly rising number of LSE alumni in China, opportunities will also grow in importance for the School on raising funds. **LSE Advancement is currently in the process of building up resources for China.**

The School already secures significant gifts from both Hong Kong and mainland China for:-

Buildings/Spaces

The Hong Kong Theatre in St. Clements, the Verdant Atrium in NAB and the new Yangtze Theatre in CBR are examples of gifts for naming spaces at LSE from Hong Kong and mainland China.

Student Scholarships

Significant funding over the past 10-15 years for students from China and Hong Kong to undertake postgraduate study at LSE, primarily focused at MSc and PhD levels. Monies have come from individuals, corporates, and foundations in Hong Kong and China.

Research and Policy Work

Foundations and corporations from China have supported research and policy-oriented work among LSE academics. More recent examples would include on health policy on drug pricing (LSE Dept. of Health Policy) and Information Communication Technology and the Global Economy (LSE Dept. of Management).

Sponsorship of LSE Events

Financial support for LSE events in China e.g. Asia Forum; China seminars; events with friends and alumni of LSE.

LSE Executive Education and China

LSE has delivered custom and executive programmes in China and in London for Chinese entities for many years. These are normally short programmes, some one-off, and others a repeat for a fixed period of time. including

Executive Public Policy Training Programme (Beijing – 2006-2016)

50-60 Senior Chinese government officials per annum, in partnership with Peking University, SIPA, Columbia and Sciences Po, Paris, and the Central Organization Division of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China studied 9 courses over a 10 week period.

China Construction Bank (2018)

China Construction Bank is one of the world's largest banks, usually within the top 3-5 annually. In 2018 the bank signed an executive education MoU with LSE, to roll-out over several years executive training, through custom programmes. The project had an initial price estimation of £1.5million. The first of these programmes starts in 2019, in London. There is also the possibility for scaling up the project, including training in China. The bank is also looking at possible education partnerships with London Business School and other UK universities.

Bank of Jiangsu (April 2019)

The 3rd largest commercial bank (not including the country's 4 large Global Systemic Banks) in China. After an initial positive visit and meeting in London in April 2019 LSE is now in discussions for an initial custom executive programme for senior management at the bank.

Hong Kong Civil Service

A 10-week programme for junior-mid level civil service officials from Hong Kong delivered in London. The programme has been running for over 10 years.

Business and Professional Schools – China

Leading business schools in China e.g. Guanghai School of Management at Peking University, have worked with LSE for their overseas module for their executive and professional degrees e.g. MBA and EMBA.

Future Development

It is anticipated that as LSE develops its Custom Programme and Executive Education capacity there will be further clients from China, primarily from the corporate sector. LSE China (Brendan Smith) and LSE Executive Education (Russell Brooks) are in discussions on how all parts of LSE's external facing divisions collaborate to maximize executive education prospects.

LSE and China – Going Forward

Given China's presence on the global stage it is anticipated that the number of LSE academics interested in working "on China" will increase. It will be less a case of being a "China specialist", but rather looking at how China impacts on particular areas of the global social, economic and political order. Therefore, many social scientists, no matter their discipline will refer to China whether it is on global health reforms; city development; climate change; economics and inequalities or global security. China may not always be the core of their research, but rather part of their work across the globe.

Students from China will continue to apply to study at LSE. Even though the top Chinese universities now rank higher than LSE, an international perspective is cherished and respected in China.² Education matters. Circa 30% of household income in China is spent on education. Students from the rest of the world will continue to be fascinated and interested in China, as long as it remains a major global player in economics and politics. They will look for opportunities to study in China, through collaborative master degrees; undergraduate exchanges; study abroad, and elite 4-5 year double undergraduate degree programmes. Chinese companies will continue their cautious global expansion and look to hire top talent from LSE and elsewhere.

The School should continue to engage with China, training social scientists from China to make an impact for the betterment of their society, and helping students and academics from across the world understand China, through spending time at LSE in London and with LSE in China.

² In the 2020 QS rankings, Peking University is ranked 22nd; Fudan University is ranked 40th; Tsinghua University is ranked 16th. LSE is ranked 44th.

Briefing Note on Chinese Issues

Chinese Students and Scholars Association (CSSA)

1.The CSSA was disbanded by LSESU as a student society for one year at the end of the 2017-18 academic year, following numerous complaints about the running of the society. A specific recommendation of the original suspension was that any reinstatement in 2019-20 was made dependent upon compliance with the full acceptance of the sanction imposed in 2018-19.

2.In February and March 2019, four complaints were received by the SU from students about the continued operation of the society. These complaints focused upon the running of events and the appointment of the society's new committee, where the candidates were allegedly selected by the Chinese Embassy. The society's members were told that they had to vote for these candidates.

3.Separately, the School Secretary received two further complaints from an alumnus and an external supplier about the operation of the CSSA as a company which used the School's name and address.

4.SU investigations revealed that the society had continued to run events during the period of suspension despite being unauthorised to do so. It had also made room bookings via the Taiwanese Society.

5.There was subsequently a SU disciplinary panel held on 25 March 2019 for the five leaders of the CSSA society. This formally rejected the request to re-form the CSSA society and proposed the establishment of a new Chinese Students Society in 2019-20 with the support of the SU. This would enhance social community, academic advancement and support of Chinese students at the School, but without any formal links to external CSSA organisations or CSSA groups at other institutions. The panel confirmed that any breaches of these sanctions or of other SU policies would be addressed by further disciplinary actions and more severe sanctions.

6.The key factors underpinning the decision of the panel were:

- There was an apparent lack of understanding on the part of the students of the seriousness of the allegations or acceptance of responsibility for what had happened;
- Previous attempts to enforce sanctions and penalties to ensure the CSSA's compliance with SU procedures had been unsuccessful for at least the last four or five years and the panel was not satisfied the CSSA could operate independently from external influence if it continued in its previous form;
- Ongoing concern that the CSSA group would be unable to run democratic functions and follow SU finance and event procedures;
- There was no wish to penalise the School's large current and future community of Chinese students for the failures of the group leaders to adhere to SU policy and procedures.

Confucius Institute

7.The agreement was reviewed by the Legal Team earlier this year and amendments to the draft agreed at SMC on 7 May 2019. These were:

- To place CIBL operations within core School frameworks and values, primarily the Ethics Code and academic freedom
- To place UK operations in the context of English law
- To clarify that the Chinese Ministry of Education funding will be used to cover both direct and indirect costs

8.The termination arrangements do make provision for the agreement to be mutually ended if one party gives at least six months notice, there is no wish to collaborate further, it becomes impossible to deliver the agreement (with no fault implied for either party), the image and reputation of one party is harmed by the other, or force majeure occurs.

9.The agreement runs for five years from the date it is signed or it is assumed to have been renewed if no indication is given 90 days before the expiry date. We are in an interesting position as the agreement was technically automatically renewed earlier this year, but the Institute then agreed to our requested amendments. They have since dragged their feet and there is now a request to sign the agreement. If/when it is signed, under the agreement, the five year clock would start ticking at that point. This would effectively extend the arrangement for another c6 months beyond the five years due to the time the agreement has taken to resolve. However, with the provision in place allowing us to give six months notice prior to termination, maybe this matters rather less.

Huawei Funding

10.A proposed three-year consultancy project donation of £105k from Huawei was approved by the Ethics (Gifts and Donations) Panel on 12 September.

11.The project is to provide a comprehensive study on how Huawei has internally supported innovation and product development in the past twenty years, focusing upon the transition from 2G infrastructure to technology leadership in 5G and governance, incentive and innovation at Huawei. It builds upon over two years of research that Jonathan Liebenau has been doing with the company so far. There is a possibility that the project could be extended to five years.

12.In discussion, two kinds of reputational risk were identified – commercial and geopolitical. The Panel noted that the proposal was for a relatively low value and the funds were to support a distinct piece of consulting research where the relationship would be clear in terms of the service being provided. It was agreed that the contract should include clauses to protect academic freedom and the use of the research for academic purposes, to mitigate the risk that the research could be used publicly by Huawei to validate the company and for the LSE to be able to control any media coverage, and to protect the use of the LSE brand and logo.

From: [Nadal.L](#)
To: [Shafik.Minouche](#)
Subject: China Matters
Date: 25 October 2019 11:58:05
Attachments: [China Briefing CIBL and CSSA.docx](#)

Dear Minouche

With apologies for the delay, please find attached a briefing note on China related issues with which I have had involvement in recent months.

They focus on the Chinese Students and Scholars Association, the Confucius Institute agreement, and a recent donation from Huawei.

If you have any queries on anything, do let me know.

Have a great weekend.

Louise

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