


“Actively Participating in the Cause of the Reunification of the Ancestor-Land Through Practical Actions”

**Chu Ting Tang OBE 邓柱廷 / 鄧柱廷
and the United Front Work Department**



英透 UK-CHINA
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UK-China Transparency (UKCT) was founded on the premise that the public deserve more and better information about ties between the UK and China, and that transparency should be a key pillar of our engagement with the country.

The UK and China have a wide-ranging relationship in trade, industry, education, and politics. Connections have grown steadily deeper in the last twenty years, especially since the governments of both countries heralded a ‘golden era’ of relations in 2015. China is now the UK’s fourth largest economic partner.

UKCT aims to fill a vital gap in knowledge about ties between Chinese and British educational and research institutions, companies, NGOs, political groups and government bodies.

We will do so by conducting research on key case studies, curating a unique library of primary sources, running public events and outreach initiatives, championing freedom of information, and providing informational support to those in need of it.

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OF THE ANCESTOR-LAND THROUGH PRACTICAL ACTIONS”
Chu Ting Tang OBE 邓柱廷 / 鄧柱廷 and the United Front Work Department

Cover images: for image sources and discussion see footnote 35 for the top left image; footnote 69 for the top right image; 7 for middle left; 15 for the middle right; 43 for bottom left; and 57 for bottom right.

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I. Introduction

Chu Ting Tang OBE (surname Tang, pinyin name Deng Zhuting, 邓柱廷 / 鄧柱廷) is one of the main public influence agents supporting the Chinese Communist Party’s agenda in the UK.

Tang, a British citizen and millionaire, has for more than a decade been one of the most prominent pro-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) figures amongst the small number of British Chinese people who engage frequently with the CCP.

Tang has been living in the UK since 1975. He has had exceptionally close links, which can be publicly documented on the Chinese-language internet, to the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD). Tang has frequently engaged with very senior UFWD and CCP cadres, both in the UK and China. At UFWD events in China, Tang has been given a status consistent with a high ranking position. For example, according to official Chinese sources, Tang was appointed as a “vice-president” of an important UFWD organisation at one such event in 2019. Usually, only very high-ranking UFWD officials themselves are given this role, with only a handful of foreign nationals in the last decade being appointed to it.

According to the Intelligence & Security Committee of Parliament’s report on China: ¹

“The United Front Work Department, one of the most important departments of the CCP, is tasked with building and maintaining support for the Party, both at home and overseas, and is therefore concerned with domestic influence and control, and influence and interference activities directed at the Chinese diaspora, from managing relations with prominent Chinese individuals and groups to coordinating support for Chinese positions or targeting dissident groups abroad.”

The record of Tang’s closeness to the CCP and UFWD and his own statements and activism in support of CCP positions together suggest that

he is carrying out at least some of these functions. However, UKCT has no evidence whatsoever to suggest Tang has been involved in targeting dissidents or in any illegal conduct.

In 2015, Tang collaborated with the Chinese government to establish an entity calling itself an “Overseas Chinese Service Centre” in the UK, though UKCT could find little trace of its activity post-2018. This centre was part of a programme intended to involve Chinese diaspora figures close to the CCP, such as Tang, in the administration of transnational governance and in the provision of various services for Chinese citizens abroad.

Tang has played a prominent role in campaigning within the UK in support of the CCP’s stance on various issues, such as the South China Sea dispute, Taiwan and Hong Kong democracy protests. He has taken part in, led and organised various public events and initiatives campaigning on these issues in the UK.

Tang is also close to the Chinese Embassy in London and is treated as a key leader by its staff. Tang is frequently approached for comment by official Chinese state-run media and referred to approvingly on Chinese government and CCP websites. On these occasions, the comments Tang gives are nationalistic.

“To be upright and proper Chinese people, we must bravely take up the mantle of the righteousness of the nation, [...] actively participating in the cause of the reunification of the ancestor-land through practical actions.” ²

– Tang Chu Ting OBE, quoted on an important UFWD website in 2022

Tang has served as the main figurehead of the London Chinatown Chinese Association (LCCA) for more than a decade. This group has close ties to the Chinese Embassy, and partners with both it and various Chinese state-owned sponsors to organise

what has been described as the largest Chinese New Year events in the world outside of East Asia. This takes place every year in Chinatown and Trafalgar Square, with CCP propaganda incorporated into the event.

The LCCA’s events are regularly attended by local and national politicians and other important public figures; Tang himself was repeatedly invited to 10 Downing Street for Chinese New Year celebrations from 2017 to 2020. Tang has also been involved in British political campaigning, offering his support to the Conservative candidate for the 2021 London mayoral election, and lobbying to influence British domestic policy by leading protests against Home Office immigration raids on establishments in Chinatown in 2018.

Tang was awarded an OBE in 2011 for “services to Chinese People in Chinatown, Westminster, London.” UKCT has not seen a copy of his citation. Tang has been treated by British public bodies and public figures as an authentic and representative leader

of London’s British Chinese community, without public reference to his CCP ties. UKCT identified one exception: in 2024, the then Security Minister Tom Tugendhat publicly referred to Tang as the CCP’s “representative”.

Tang and his wife are millionaires with interests in several well-known restaurants in London’s Chinatown, and various properties.

It is important to note that until 2022, when MI5 issued an “Interference Alert” about another individual with links to the UFWD, Christine Lee, the British government had not promoted the idea that some forms of engagement or cooperation with the UFWD should be viewed as a potential source of national security problems. Indeed, in the past, the British government has in practice promoted some forms of engagement or cooperation with the UFWD.

Tang chose not to comment on the contents of this report.

¹ <https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/ISC-China.pdf>.
² <https://web.archive.org/web/20250528155535/https://www.chinaql.org/n1/2022/0905/c448252-32519782.html>.

II. United Front Work Department: Accolades, Engagement and Collaboration

UKCT has published a webpage detailing the nature and operations of the UFWD in the UK in detail.³ According to the Intelligence & Security Committee of Parliament’s report on China:⁴

“The United Front Work Department, one of the most important departments of the CCP, is tasked with building and maintaining support for the Party, both at home and overseas, and is therefore concerned with domestic influence and control, and influence and interference activities directed at the Chinese diaspora, from managing relations with prominent Chinese individuals and groups to coordinating support for Chinese positions or targeting dissident groups abroad.”


Tang has enjoyed close links to the UFWD. Specifically:

- Tang has been invited repeatedly to important national UFWD-run events in China, and given prominence at these events, on one occasion appearing to shake Xi Jinping’s hand, on another giving a speech, and on another being filmed on stage alongside Wang Huning, then the most senior CCP leader overseeing the UFWD.
- According to official Chinese sources, Tang was appointed as a “vice-president” (副会长) of an important UFWD-run organisation in 2019. UKCT could only identify three non-resident ethnic Chinese people being appointed to this role in recent decades. The majority of people appointed to this role have been Chinese officials, with roughly half being top-ranking UFWD cadres.

- Tang jointly established an “Overseas Chinese Service Centre” in the UK in collaboration with the Chinese government in 2015.
- Tang was the only member of the Europe-wide Chinese diaspora to be invited into the Tiananmen Gate to watch the celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2019.

In May 2019, Tang was pictured meeting Xi Jinping and Wang Yang (汪洋, then fourth most senior member of the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee) at a large event organised by the UFWD in Beijing. In attendance were hundreds of ethnic Chinese representatives from around the world, including as many as eight others from the UK. They were a mixture of delegates attending the first meeting of the fifth congress of the China Overseas Friendship Association (COFA, 中华海外联谊会⁵) and delegates attending the ninth Conference for Friendship of Overseas Chinese Associations (CFOCA, 世界华侨华人社团联谊大会). COFA is run by the UFWD, and CFOCA was described on Chinese state media as organised by COFA and the UFWD.⁶ Tang appeared prominently in the front row of a photograph of this event, appearing to have shaken Xi’s hand (see image opposite).⁷

In spite of this substantial honour, Tang’s name did not appear on a list published by COFA naming the delegates of its fifth congress.⁸ However, from 2020 onwards official Chinese sources can be found referring to Tang as a “vice-president” (副会长) of COFA’s fifth congress.⁹ UKCT conducted an analysis



of official Chinese sources referring to holders of the title.¹⁰ Of 23 individuals named as vice-presidents analysed by UKCT, 11 appeared to be high-ranking career UFWD cadres, 3 were other CCP members from the PRC with a career spent at least partly in officialdom, 4 were Hong Kong tycoons with long-standing public links to the CCP and UFWD, and 5 more were businessmen from Macao (3), the US (1) and Taiwan (1) about whom the same could be said. On this basis, UKCT concluded that Tang was appointed a COFA vice-president in 2019, and that this was an exceptionally high accolade.

In addition to rendering their status, COFA’s 2019 constitution states that vice-presidents such as Tang should be members of COFA’s standing council, the “executive body” (执行机构) of COFA, usually meeting once a year and responsible for “leading the association’s execution of its daily work” (领导本会开展日常工作) outside of its main sessions.


COFA’s constitutionally enshrined goal is to contribute to “the reunification of the ancestor-land and the realisation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (统一祖国、实现中华民族伟大复兴).¹¹

As for CFOCA, according to official CCP sources there were more than 450 CFOCA attendees in 2019 (fewer than there were COFA delegates); the theme of the event was “Embracing the New Era and Realising the Chinese Dream” (拥抱新时代 共圆中国梦). The most senior UFWD officials were in attendance.¹²

According to a UFWD website, Tang himself gave a speech during the conference, reportedly boasting of the London Chinatown Chinese Association’s (LCCA) work “actively introducing the true China to the local [i.e., British] government”, and describing how the LCCA’s Trafalgar Square celebrations enjoyed the “strong support” of the UFWD and the Chinese government’s Ministry of Culture.¹³ According to an

³ <https://ukctransparency.org/projects-2/the-united-front-in-the-uk/>.
⁴ <https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/ISC-China.pdf>.
⁵ Sometimes ‘Chinese Overseas Friendship Association’ in English.
⁶ https://web.archive.org/web/20190605023625/http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-05/29/c_1124557130.htm.
⁷ https://web.archive.org/web/20250414181726/https://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-05/28/c_1124553444.htm and <https://web.archive.org/web/20220520105301/http://www.oushinet.com/static/content/qj/qjnews/2019-05-31/782918070585786368.html>.
⁸ <https://web.archive.org/web/20191007093220/http://www.cofa.org.cn/lsm/311497.jhtml>.
⁹ See, from state media (in 2020), <https://web.archive.org/web/20250414175006/https://paper.xinmin.cn/html/xmwb/2020-07-06/19/74105.html>; from a regional UFWD subsidiary news account (2020) https://web.archive.org/web/20240429063411/https://www.sohu.com/a/440705127_99970298; and a provincial UFWD (2021) https://web.archive.org/web/20250530110145/https://www.qb.gd.gov.cn/qwdt/content/post_535625.html; from Henan provincial government (September 2024) <https://www.hnrx.gov.cn/2024/09-26/4343506.html>.

¹⁰ UKCT would be happy to share this analysis with any interested researchers.
¹¹ <https://web.archive.org/web/20250108145527/https://www.cofa.org.cn/static/content/hlh/hlhzc/2022-09-07/1268532585017901056.html>.
¹² See, for example, <https://web.archive.org/web/20250527114215/https://www.chinaql.org/n1/2019/0531/c419643-31114874.html> and https://web.archive.org/web/20190805160937/http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2019-05/28/c_1124553444.htm.
¹³ <https://web.archive.org/web/20250421065517/https://www.oushinet.com/static/content/qj/qjnews/2019-05-31/782918070585786368.html>.



academic study, Chinese state entities dispatch singing and dancing troupes to take part in the event.¹⁴

In November 2024, COFA ran its sixth congress. Tang stood in the front row, appearing to have met the most senior CCP Politburo members, and is pictured above with Wang Huning.¹⁵ Wang is now and was then the most senior CCP leader overseeing the UFWD.¹⁶ He is a member of the standing committee of the Politburo, one of the 7 most significant CCP figures.

When the congress convened and delegates took their seats, Tang was filmed by Chinese state media sitting in the front row on a stage before all the delegates. The front row contained Wang, a handful of other senior UFWD officials, and just eight or so other guests from overseas, including Tang.¹⁷ A screenshot from the footage is shown opposite, illustrating the layout: Tang sits at the far left in the

front row, Wang in the middle. Unlike in 2019, when Tang’s presence at a similar event and his speech were publicised by official media, UKCT was able to find no named reference to Tang in any official sources for the 2024 event. It is worth noting that the activities of the UFWD have since roughly 2020 received a great deal more scrutiny outside of China. In 2024, unlike in 2019, no list of COFA delegates was published online.

These are not the only UFWD events Tang has attended in China.¹⁸ UKCT does not provide an exhaustive list here.

In 2020, a profile published in a state-owned Chinese media outlet stated that “for the 2019 national celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, [Tang] was the only European Overseas Chinese leader to mount the Tiananmen Gate [i.e., the Gate of Heavenly Peace



on Tiananmen Square] and watch the celebrations alongside the national leadership.”¹⁹ Footage of the occasion strongly suggests Tang was indeed in the building on the day, alongside perhaps two thousand others, mostly very senior CCP leaders.²⁰

Tang has been prominently honoured by the Chinese embassy at events supported by its “Overseas Chinese Affairs” section (strictly a UFWD operation from 2018 onwards) and involving favoured members of British Chinese communities.²¹ Tang has a history of collaboration and engagement with successive holders of the post of “Overseas Chinese Affairs counsellor” at the Chinese embassy in London,²²

especially Lu Haitian 卢海田, a former senior OCAO official who occupied the role from 2016 until early 2023. Tang also has a history of engagement with UFWD or OCAO officials visiting from China.²³ What follows is an example of this conduct, which comprises further evidence of Tang’s closeness to CCP, UFWD and OCAO.

In February 2015, Qiu Yuanping 裘援平, then the chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO), visited London to mark the opening of an “Overseas Chinese Service Centre” (this was the official English name of the centre, in Chinese: 华助中心) based in London’s Chinatown.²⁴ This

¹⁴ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/375993093_Negotiating_Diasporic_Identities_in_Glocal_Heritage_Discourses_The_Case_of_the_Chinese_New_Year_Celebration_in_London.

¹⁵ https://web.archive.org/web/20241120000239/http://www.locpg.gov.cn/jsdt/2024-11/19/c_1212407631.htm.

¹⁶ <https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/01/wang-hunings-first-year-supervising-the-united-front-system-taiwan-policy-and-discourse/>.

¹⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=laTM0bkr9Y> – from roughly 16 minutes in.

¹⁸ See, for example, <https://archive.ph/FoVWw#selection-133.0-133.15>.

¹⁹ <https://web.archive.org/web/20250414175006/https://paper.xinmin.cn/html/xmwb/2020-07-06/19/74105.html>.

²⁰ Footage of the event on the day, which through matching visual details suggests the photo of Tang featuring in the source above shows Tang in Tiananmen Tower as described, can be found at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xnoaWO3KDIA>.

²¹ See, for example, footage showing Tang entering a large event in London marking the 66th anniversary of the founding of the PRC alongside then Chinese ambassador Liu Xiaoming, and then sitting next to the ambassador’s wife at a banquet: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cDCZnjcGAwU>; or Tang’s prominent placement (exceptionally often next to the ambassador or his wife) at set-piece embassy events for “Overseas Chinese” people in the UK, for example, https://web.archive.org/web/20250528155337/https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zwbd_673032/jghd_673046/202409/t20240920_11493692.shtml; see also praise for Tang and the LCCA at the LCCA’s 40th anniversary event <https://archive.vn/gEgN1>; Tang’s prominence at celebrations in 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20250000000000/http://gb.china-embassy.gov.cn/dshd/202402/t20240208_11243005.htm; and Tang’s central presence at events organised by other groups, e.g. <https://archive.vn/FmBvD>.

²² In addition to the example in the text, see <https://archive.vn/bEmFN#selection-469.0-565.262>; <https://web.archive.org/web/20220815220641/https://ihuawen.com/article/index/id/56680>; <https://web.archive.org/web/20250529100952/https://www.oushinet.com/static/content/qj/qjnews/2022-10-07/1027957936309276672.html>; https://web.archive.org/web/20250530103345/https://www.sohu.com/a/207542051_100020627; <https://web.archive.org/web/20220814064850/https://www.ihuawen.com/article/index/id/56747>; and <https://web.archive.org/web/20250120030924/https://www.ihuawen.com/article/index/id/57006>.

²³ In addition to the example in the text, see <https://web.archive.org/web/20250414174429/http://www.oushinet.com/static/content/qj/qjnews/2016-03-18/795973898645536768.html>; and https://web.archive.org/save/http://gb.china-embassy.gov.cn/dshd/2018dashihuodong/201802/t20180220_3378323.htm.

²⁴ See <https://archive.vn/PPLQw> and <https://archive.vn/597KT>; see also footage of the opening event aired by Chinese state media, at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Enw6DxBJvz8>.



was and, inasmuch as it continues to exist, remains the only such centre in the UK. During Qiu’s visit, Tang took her into the Houses of Parliament (see photo above).²⁵

The London “Overseas Chinese Service Centre” was a branch of an OCAO-run programme intended to involve Chinese diaspora figures acceptable to the CCP in the administration of transnational governance and various services for Chinese citizens abroad. Academics who have studied this programme summarise its intentions as being “to assist Chinese emigrants, for example, with legal advice, to resolve local disputes, to organise cultural events, etc.”²⁶ There is also evidence from official sources that the programme was intended to provide opportunities that would enable Chinese law enforcement to expand their operations outside of China, for example by setting up “overseas mediation liaison points” (海外调解联络站) in other countries.²⁷

The changing bureaucracy behind “Overseas Chinese affairs work”

The “Overseas Chinese Service Centre” and other aspects of what the CCP calls “overseas Chinese affairs work”²⁸ (侨务工作) were formerly the responsibility of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO, part of the Chinese government), under UFWD guidance. In early 2018, as part of an overhaul of what in CCP bureaucratic terminology is referred to as “Overseas Chinese Affairs”, it was announced that OCAO would be absorbed by the UFWD as part of a process that began in 2017. According to the UFWD itself, the aim of this was “to strengthen the party’s centralized and unified leadership of united front work.”²⁹ OCAO was previously guided and overseen by the UFWD;³⁰ the reforms of 2017-18 brought it more tightly under UFWD control.

²⁵ <https://web.archive.org/web/20250414174429/http://www.oushinet.com/static/content/qj/qjnews/2016-03-18/795973898645536768.html>.
²⁶ See academic literature on the topic: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/18681026241232998>; see also the programme’s website at <https://www.chinaqw.com/hzzx>.
²⁷ See <https://web.archive.org/web/20230622154053/https://www.chinanews.com.cn/m/hr/2018/01-14/8423514.shtml>, which describes how the heads of several “Overseas Chinese Service Centres” internationally were brought to a “police[-run] Overseas Chinese workshop” (警侨工作室) and shown facilities enabling “remote trials” (远程庭审); see also <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/18681026241232998>.
²⁸ For more detail on what this means, visit <https://ukctransparency.org/projects-2/the-united-front-in-the-uk/>.
²⁹ See <https://jamestown.org/program/reorganizing-the-united-front-work-department-new-structures-for-a-new-era-of-diaspora-and-religious-affairs-work/> citing part 15 of section 1 (一、深化党中央机构改革) of a CCP announcement made via Xinhua in March 2018: https://web.archive.org/web/20180323181551/https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2018-03/21/content_5276191.htm#1.
³⁰ There is ample evidence of this: see, for example, UFWD guidance on ‘Overseas Chinese Affairs’, such as that translated by UKCT at <https://ukctransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/The-Relationship-between-Compatriots-at-Home-and-Abroad-with-Chinese-Characteristics.pdf>.

Tang was chosen as the figurehead for London’s OCAO Centre. In June 2016, he attended the eighth CFOCA conference in Beijing. There, he received an official award on behalf of the LCCA, which according to an official source was in recognition of its organising the annual Trafalgar Square gala, decades of “service and advice in such areas as social welfare, tax, law, children’s education, elderly people’s health, and so on”, and the establishment of the “Overseas Chinese Service Centre”.³¹

In 2017, OCAO published a page displaying the LCCA as the “Overseas Chinese group” connected to the London Centre, and listing the address of a restaurant owned by Tang, Imperial China, as the Centre’s address.³² UKCT was able to contact Tang in advance of the publication of this report using a phone number listed on the same page.

In 2018, a UFWD website and Chinese state media described Tang as the “chairman” (主席) of the Centre and attested to the presence of the Chinese

embassy’s “Overseas Chinese Affairs counsellor” at an event run by the Centre at which it launched its “UK Overseas Chinese Life Guide”.³³ The guide was intended to be a practical guide to public services and other aspects of life in the UK, including the welfare system, education system, legal system, and so on; it also contained a directory of approved community organisations and Chinese schools.

A photograph of the launch event (reproduced below) shows Tang next to Lu Haitian, then the embassy’s “Overseas Chinese Affairs counsellor”, who, according to a Chinese media site, emphasised that the Centre received “listing/launch support” (挂牌支持) from OCAO (by now absorbed into the UFWD), but it was the “Overseas Chinese themselves” who were the “organisers” (承办主). Lu reportedly listed the goals of the centre as: to produce the guide; to put together a team of volunteers for publicity and administration; to put together a legal aid team; to set up an emergency hotline for “Overseas Chinese”; to establish a



³¹ <https://web.archive.org/web/20250414170619/https://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2016/0612/39463.shtml> and <https://archive.vn/uvzhz>.
³² <https://archive.vn/OCovB>; alternatively <https://web.archive.org/web/20200117010248/http://www.chinaqw.com/huazhu/2017/01-24/123850.shtml>.
³³ <https://web.archive.org/web/20210616115316/https://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/hbsx/200/3061.shtml> is the UFWD website; <https://archive.vn/wqjun#selection-191.1-217.60> is the state media source; see also reference to the guide, in this case as the work of the LCCA, from another UK entity <https://archive.vn/jj0ky>.

“network platform” (网络平台); to establish a “work liaison mechanism” (工作联系机制); and apply for funding from OCAO (UKCT has no evidence funding was applied for or received).³⁴

Other than the guide, UKCT’s analysis has found little other evidence of the Centre conducting any activity. Two other groups were (to be) involved

in the provision of the Centre’s services but they were already committed to providing similar services in any case.

Nonetheless, Tang was promoted by the UFWD as the Centre’s figurehead and was depicted as such by the Chinese embassy’s “Overseas Chinese affairs counsellor” and by state media and UFWD sources.

³⁴ <https://archive.vn/oF8Jv>; for more on plans for OCAO funding, see <https://web.archive.org/web/20250215055104/https://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/rdjj/193/2878.shtml>.

III. “China’s sacred territory will not tolerate being trampled upon”:³⁵ propaganda, patriotic campaigning and public activism

Tang is one of the most vocal pro-CCP political activists amongst British Chinese communities. Specifically:

- Tang is frequently approached for comment by official Chinese state-run media and referred to approvingly on Chinese government and CCP websites.
- Quotations attributed to Tang are strongly supportive of the CCP’s stance on various important issues, such as those relating to China’s territorial claims against the Republic of China (Taiwan), Japan, and the Philippines; and relating to the governance of Hong Kong. The tone of Tang’s languages is usually highly nationalistic and characterised by stock patriotic and irredentist phraseology promoted by the CCP.
- Tang has taken a prominent part in, or organised, various public events and initiatives campaigning on these issues in the UK. These events have often been attended by officials from the UFWD or the Chinese Embassy in London or promoted in state media.

Official CCP and Chinese government websites and news sources have on many occasions featured Tang prominently as a commentator offering support for the CCP’s programme and its stance on key issues. The tone of the words attributed to Tang is nationalistic, and much concerned with the “dignity”, “righteousness” and “unity” (etcetera) of the “ancestor-land” or nation, usually deploying stock phrases promoted by the CCP. Tang is notable and exceptional in comparison with other UK-based individuals for the high stature or bureaucratic level of

the organisations quoting him and for the frequency with which they have done so.³⁶ A few examples are set out for illustrative purposes below.

In August 2022, Tang gave a quote on Taiwan to an important UFWD website. Tang reportedly said that: “I hope that the majority of our compatriots in Taiwan will stand firmly on the right side of history and act as upright and proper Chinese people. [...] To be upright and proper Chinese people, we must bravely take up the mantle of the righteousness of the nation, conform to the great trends of history, promote great cross-strait exchanges [with Taiwan], and great cooperation and development, actively participating in the cause of the reunification of the ancestor-land through practical actions. The ancestor-land is our strongest support. A well nation, a well people – only then will everyone be well. The greater part of Overseas Chinese in Britain firmly believe that the ancestor-land must be reunified and will inevitably be reunified.”³⁷

In October 2022, a website belonging to a Beijing UFWD organisation attributed comments praising Xi Jinping’s report to the CCP’s 20th Party Congress to Tang. Tang, described as an advisor to the organisation in question, reportedly called the report “exciting and inspiring”, and added: “We firmly believe that the prospect of China’s progress is ever brighter and that China’s new development will bring new opportunities to the world. Our ancestor-land is our strongest support, and we will definitely unite and gather the strength of Overseas Chinese in Britain to be pragmatic promoters of Sino-British friendship and cooperation and active contributors to the great

³⁵ The source of this quote attributed to Tang is <https://web.archive.org/web/20250414174429/http://www.oushinet.com/static/content/qj/qjnews/2016-03-18/795973898645536768.html>.

³⁶ As well as the examples discussed in the text, see also https://web.archive.org/web/20250414181357/https://www.gdtzb.gov.cn/qwgz/qwdt/content/post_84743.html; <https://web.archive.org/web/20230101012345/http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0101/c64387-32597798.html>; https://web.archive.org/web/20250528162020/https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrhwb/html/2019-09/30/content_1948757.htm; <https://web.archive.org/web/20250414181125/http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/bqch/184/2645.shtml>; and <https://web.archive.org/web/20250530104539/https://www.chinaql.org/n1/2022/0102/c419643-32322782.html>.

³⁷ <https://web.archive.org/web/20250528155535/https://www.chinaql.org/n1/2022/0905/c448252-32519782.html>.

rejuvenation [of China] and the Chinese dream.”³⁸ Tang has been quoted by official sources praising the CCP on other occasions.³⁹

In January 2023, Tang was quoted on a website belonging to the China Zhi Gong party, a minor party in the PRC’s rubber-stamp parliament, which has close links to the UFWD and its “Overseas Chinese affairs” work:⁴⁰ “We must firmly safeguard our country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and strive for the realisation of the reunification of the ancestor-land and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation... The majority of overseas Chinese in Britain will share in the great cause of national rejuvenation, adhere to the fight against ‘independence’ [secessionist activism] and promote reunification, and help the ancestor-land achieve reunification.”⁴¹

‘Reunification’

It is important to note the meaning and historical context of the CCP’s use of the phrase, “the reunification of the ancestor-land” (统一祖国). Historically, the Han Chinese people who constitute China’s ethnic majority - and dominate the CCP – have occupied only part of today’s People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the majority ethnic group. This part accounts for less than half the current land area of the PRC.

After the CCP’s victory in the Chinese Civil War, the CCP reconquered what had been Qing Dynasty colonies in China’s west, namely Tibet (today the administrative regions of Qinghai and Xizang) and East Turkestan (today the administrative region of Xinjiang). The CCP also made claims to Himalayan lands still disputed with various neighbours, including India; and to the majority of the South China Sea.

The CCP’s enemies in the Civil War, the Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party), fled to Taiwan, which had also been a Chinese colony and was later a Qing Dynasty province before it was conquered by Japan in 1895. The CCP claims that Taiwan is part of the PRC.

“Reunification”, to the CCP, means asserting Chinese control over all these areas. This desire to exert control currently expresses itself through:

- Legalistic disputes with Japan over the Senkaku Islands, and military incursions
- Maritime clashes with Philippines, Vietnamese and Malaysian vessels and the construction of reef bases and other infrastructure in island groups it claims in the South China Sea
- Threats to absorb Taiwan by any means necessary, including military conquest, and associated military incursions and drills around Taiwan; as well as associated anti-independence and pro-reunification political warfare
- Border incursions accompanied by infrastructure construction in Bhutan, amounting to bit-part de facto annexation
- Involvement in limited violent struggles against Indian forces in the territory referred to by the CCP as ‘Aksai Chin’
- Aggressive internal repression of all secessionist or independence movements, including Uyghur, Mongol, Tibetan, and Hong Kong independence activists

“Reunification” thus expresses the CCP’s long-running nationalist policy of expansionism, aggression and internal repression. UKCT has published a blog detailing the CCP’s concept of “reunification” and its context in detail at <https://ukctransparency.org/reunification/>.

The CCP’s island ambitions

In 2013, Tang led a rally in London against “Japanese Imperialism” in relation to China and Japan’s dispute over control of the Diaoyu Islands, also known as the Senkaku Islands (pictured opposite top).⁴²

In 2016, Tang led two rallies outside the Philippines’ and the United States’ London embassies, protesting against the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling relating to China’s claims to sovereignty over parts of the South China Sea (screenshot from video shown opposite below).⁴³



³⁸ <https://web.archive.org/web/20250528153511/http://www.bjql.org.cn/html/1/189/197/261/9745.html>.

³⁹ See, for example, <https://archive.vn/yZ2vU>.

⁴⁰ <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you/>.

⁴¹ https://web.archive.org/web/20250528143120/https://www.gdzgd.cn/dwll/qjdt/content/post_32927.html.

⁴² <https://web.archive.org/web/20250414174429/https://www.oushinet.com/static/content/qj/qjnews/2016-03-18/795973898645536768.html>.

⁴³ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=exRsyRw4pLI>; UKCT has also downloaded this video.

Taiwan

In 2015, Tang attended an event in London intended to celebrate the ten-year anniversary of China’s Anti-Secession Law of 2005. Tang spoke and appeared centrally in coverage of the event.⁴⁴

In 2018, Tang and the LCCA reportedly co-hosted an event in conjunction with UFWD officials from China and the UFWD’s “Overseas Chinese Affairs counsellor” in the Chinese embassy, then Lu Haitian (on whom, see above). The event reportedly featured discussion of how best to galvanise support for the CCP’s position in Taiwan amongst British Chinese communities.⁴⁵

In 2022, Tang was quoted in a major state-owned newspaper, the *People’s Daily*, as an example of a prominent “Overseas Chinese” leader condemning the visit to Taiwan of Nancy Pelosi, then Speaker of the United States’ House of Representatives. Tang reportedly said that “Overseas Chinese” people in Britain strongly condemned collusion between US politicians and separatist forces in favour of Taiwanese independence and firmly supported the CCP’s stance.⁴⁶



Tang was previously one of six “honorary presidents” (名誉会长) of the UK branch of a UFWD-run organisation that promotes the CCP’s stance on Taiwan.⁴⁷

Hong Kong

In 2015, Tang wrote a letter to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on the situation in Hong Kong. The letter was supportive of the CCP’s policy towards Hong Kong and accused pro-democracy protestors of making “illegal and unreasonable” demands.

A second open letter attached as an appendix stated that its signatories, including Tang, supported “freedom of expression” and “peaceful demonstrations” but condemned the “blocking of major roads” and called for the Hong Kong government to “declare” this illegal.⁴⁸

In 2019, Tang again appeared at the centre of a major rally in central London in support of the Hong Kong government’s and the CCP’s position and against pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong (see photo below).⁴⁹

⁴⁴ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ll3FEIgh6zM>.

⁴⁵ <https://archive.vn/bEmFN#selection-469.0-565.262>.

⁴⁶ <https://archive.vn/7szUw#selection-1511.2-1531.88>.

⁴⁷ <https://web.archive.org/web/20230104024243/https://www.ukpcrs.com/members>.

⁴⁸ <https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/78/foreign-affairs-committee/publications/written-evidence/?SearchTerm=HNG0750&DateFrom=&DateTo=&SessionId=> and <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/54234/pdf/>.

⁴⁹ <https://archive.vn/iig12>; Footage of the event can be found here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SGOzFfBzw5l>.

In 2021, Tang’s name and that of the LCCA appeared prominently on the front page of the European edition of a pro-establishment Hong Kong newspaper, *Sing Tao Daily*, calling for pro-CCP and pro-establishment policies for Hong Kong.⁵⁰ There are other examples of CCP-linked papers publishing front-page statements in support of the CCP’s

policies for Hong Kong which feature Tang’s name and that of the LCCA.⁵¹

Welcoming Xi

In 2015, Tang played a lead role in organising groups to welcome the arrival of Xi Jinping on a state visit to the UK (see photo below).⁵²



⁵⁰ <https://web.archive.org/web/20210714101326/https://www.hykeurope.org/public/%E6%94%AF%E6%8C%81%E3%80%8C%E6%84%9B%E5%9C%8B%E8%80%85%E6%B2%BB%E6%B8%AF%E3%80%8D.pdf>; https://web.archive.org/web/20250527173932/https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_15604088; and <https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/junshiwaizhao/al-11252021144336.html>; UKCT has also downloaded the original paper front page in high-definition PDF form and can provide it upon request.

⁵¹ See, for example, <https://ukctransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/02-04-2021-Sing-Tao-Daily-front-page.pdf>.

⁵² <https://web.archive.org/web/20250414174429/https://www.oushinet.com/static/content/qj/qjnews/2016-03-18/795973898645536768.html>.

IV. “An important communication channel”: the London Chinatown Chinese Association, campaigning and visits to Downing Street

- Tang has been president of the London Chinatown Chinese Association (LCCA) since 2000. The LCCA runs events that bring influential figures in British politics and society together with Chinese officials.
- Tang has involved himself in British political campaigning, offering his support to the Conservative candidate for the 2021 London mayoral election, and campaigning to influence British domestic policy in leading protests against Home Office immigration raids on establishments in Chinatown in 2018.
- Tang was awarded an OBE in 2011 for “services to Chinese People in Chinatown, Westminster, London.”⁵³

The LCCA runs an annual Chinese New Year celebration in Trafalgar Square which is sponsored by various companies, many of them Chinese or Chinese state-owned, and which according to Chinese official sources is supported by the Chinese government (see previous sections). The LCCA also runs other events, such as its own anniversary

events, and for the traditional Chinese Mid-Autumn Festival. What follows are some examples of the kinds of figures from the British establishment to have attended these.

Guests who have attended the LCCA's events include Mayor Sadiq Khan,⁵⁴ the then Prince Charles,⁵⁵ Lord Mayors of Westminster and local politicians including Westminster councillors and Members of the London Assembly,⁵⁶ Prince Andrew (see photo opposite),⁵⁷ mayoral candidate Sean Bailey,⁵⁸ former Members of Parliament Mark Logan⁵⁹ and Mark Field,⁶⁰ senior and mid-ranking Metropolitan Police officers,⁶¹ and British businesspeople.⁶² In 2024, Sadiq Khan was criticised in respect of his appearance at the LCCA's Chinese New Year event by then Security Minister Tom Tugendhat, who described Tang as the CCP's “representative”.⁶³

In August 2021, just after China's new ambassador to the UK, Zheng Zeguang 鄭澤光, took up his post, the website of the Chinese embassy in London posted a message of an online meeting between Zheng and Tang, along with other LCCA



Sadiq Khan poses alongside Tang at the LCCA's Chinese New Year event in 2024. Source: Khan's official X account, <https://x.com/SadiqKhan/status/1756728052975858034> Caption: “Here in London, we don’t just tolerate our diversity - we respect, embrace & celebrate it. An amazing afternoon in Chinatown celebrating Lunar New Year & the huge contribution London’s East & South East Asian communities make to our capital.”

⁵³ https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7f96f640f0b6230269065a/NY_2011.csv/preview.
⁵⁴ See, for example, https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mayoroflondon_it-was-an-honour-to-join-the-london-chinatown-activity-7162471911552184320-MTwR.
⁵⁵ <https://www.express.co.uk/news/royal/559296/Prince-Charles-and-Camilla-visit-Chinatown-for-Chinese-New-Year>.
⁵⁶ For example https://web.archive.org/web/20250508074716/http://gb.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/dshdjih/202402/t20240214_11245470.htm; and <https://web.archive.org/web/20230929030626/http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0927/c1002-40086369.html>; and https://web.archive.org/web/20250531172259/https://gb.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/ambassador/dshjicf/2018remarks/201802/t20180219_3385569.htm.
⁵⁷ <https://www.weareresonate.com/2016/07/prince-andrew-unveils-new-chinese-gate-london-chinatown-2/>.
⁵⁸ https://web.archive.org/web/20250508071210/http://gb.china-embassy.gov.cn/sxgw/2018shiguanhuodong/201811/t20181114_3419147.htm.
⁵⁹ <https://web.archive.org/web/20230929030626/http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0927/c1002-40086369.html>.
⁶⁰ https://web.archive.org/web/20250530185348/https://gb.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/EmbassyNews/2014/201402/t20140218_3387610.htm; the LCCA also once paid for Field to visit China, per <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmregmem/071106/memi10.htm>.
⁶¹ See, for example, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/destinysagent/2260600083>; https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-police/lists_and_registers/corporate/mps-gifts-hospitality-register-february2025.xlsx; and <https://x.com/AmbZhengZeguang/status/1886490264136769875/photo/1>.
⁶² <https://www.lner.co.uk/news/lner-lion-train-ers-celebrate-chinese-new-year/>.
⁶³ <https://web.archive.org/web/20250322173852/https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/uk-bancomment-02152024005132.html>.

representatives. According to the Chinese Embassy, Tang boasted of the LCCA’s record “upholding the dignity and unity of the ancestor-land [China]”. Zheng praised the LCCA’s work, calling it an “important communication channel”.⁶⁴

One of the other main leaders of the LCCA, Huang Ping 黄萍, has previously the subject of investigation by UKCT for her connections to the UFWD, and her work towards the formation of a partnership between Imperial College London and the Jiangsu Automation Research Institute, a Chinese state-owned company that designs marine combat drones for the People’s Liberation Army Navy.⁶⁵

Tang has involved himself on a few occasions in British political campaigning. In 2018, he was one of the leaders of a campaign to halt Home Office immigration raids on Chinatown restaurants. The campaign involved a march from Chinatown to the Home Office’s headquarters, where a large group of protestors, many with links to the Chinese embassy, picketed the main entrance.⁶⁶ Tang was also involved in lobbying against restrictions on asylum



seekers’ right to work and other immigration policies in 2010.⁶⁷

In 2021, Tang endorsed Sean Bailey’s campaign for the London mayorship, appearing alongside Bailey in Chinatown, standing in front of a bus covered in promotional material, some of it in Chinese, for Bailey’s campaign.⁶⁸

Tang has been repeatedly invited to 10 Downing Street for Chinese New Year celebrations there, on several occasions being pictured leading the celebrations. For example, Tang was pictured at celebrations in Downing Street in 2017 (pictured below left),⁶⁹ 2018,⁷⁰ 2019,⁷¹ and 2020 (pictured below right).⁷²

From the next Downing Street Chinese New Year celebration in 2023 onwards (there were none during the pandemic), Tang appears not to have attended. These more recent events are notable for the presence of well-known anti-CCP figures, whereas earlier events are notable for the presence of figures with links to the CCP, such as Tang and Huang Ping (see section above).



⁶⁴ https://web.archive.org/web/20250528153234/https://gb.china-embassy.gov.cn/chn/lsfw_137163/lqdt/202401/t20240104_11216513.htm.
⁶⁵ <https://ukctransparency.org/ukct-publishes-new-research-on-imperial-college-london-and-the-chinese-military/>.
⁶⁶ See, for example, coverage of the march here: <https://archive.is/b2onK#selection-165.21-263.55>.
⁶⁷ https://www.bbc.com/ukchina/simp/uk_life/2010/12/101201_uk_chinese.
⁶⁸ <https://x.com/YeoEdmond/status/1391474986926411779>; UKCT has also downloaded photographs of the occasion.
⁶⁹ https://web.archive.org/web/20241213233032/https://www.sohu.com/a/127153801_213072.
⁷⁰ See, for example, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/number10gov/32054461217/in/photostream/>.
⁷¹ See, for example, <https://web.archive.org/web/20250216011856/https://ciac.co.uk/2019/02/06/chinese-new-year-celebration-downing-street/>; or <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2EKa1RzdCmY>.
⁷² <https://web.archive.org/web/20250206165325/https://ciac.co.uk/2020/01/27/chinese-new-years-eve-on-january-24-2020/>.


V. Tang’s business interests

UKCT conducted a thorough analysis of Tang’s UK directorships as registered on Companies House in order to establish his business activities and partners. UKCT was not able to access detailed corporate data from China but Tang does not appear to have extensive interests there.⁷³ Some of Tang’s investments and relationships are described below. Nothing in this section is meant to imply any wrongdoing, let alone criminality, on the part of Tang.

Tang has served as director or shareholder of several dozen companies. He is best known as a restaurateur, and as proprietor of Imperial China, a restaurant in Chinatown. Tang and his wife also have interests in several other restaurants and properties,

including 12/14 Newport Place, 5 Newport Place, 25-27 Lisle Street. As of March 2016, Tang also had a 10% stake in a company that owns a huge site in Woolwich, bought for £11 million in 2011. The last time the company stated its shareholdings in March 2016, Tang owned 10% and was a director. Tang ceased to serve as a director several months later.⁷⁴ The site comprises existing buildings and an undeveloped site, and plans have been submitted for a huge development comprising hundreds of homes (see image of plans below).⁷⁵

Based on this analysis, UKCT concludes that Tang and his wife are likely to have assets worth many millions of pounds.



⁷³ UKCT was able to view some information about a Chinese company of which Tang was director. UKCT is only aware of this one company, which appears to have dissolved in 2023.
⁷⁴ <https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/06480308/filing-history>.
⁷⁵ <https://greenwichwire.co.uk/2024/11/20/electric-works-woolwich-student-housing-co-living-re-shape/>.

“ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE CAUSE OF THE REUNIFICATION
OF THE ANCESTOR-LAND THROUGH PRACTICAL ACTIONS”

Chu Ting Tang OBE 邓柱廷 / 鄧柱廷 and the United Front Work Department

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